ARE WE READY ?

HOWARD D. WHEELER

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Major General U.S. Army

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

ARE WE READY?

BY HOWARD D. WHEELER

WITH A LETTER
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD

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TO THE
DAUGHTER OF A SOLDIER—MY WIFE

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to express my gratitude to the editor of *Harper's Weekly* for permission to reprint in this volume certain papers which appeared in that publication during December, 1914, and January, 1915.

I am also indebted to Mr. Oliver Herford and to Mr. Boardman Robinson for the right to use drawings owned by them.

H. D. W.

New York, January 7, 1915.

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A LETTER

GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N.Y.,
January 8th, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. WHEELER: —

I have read with much interest your articles in *Harper's Weekly*, written evidently for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the American people the necessity of adequate preparedness for defense, and I am very glad to learn that you are to publish a book on the same general lines with a view to bringing our needs in this particular to the attention of the American public. It is a subject, in my opinion, deserving of serious and careful attention on the part of the people. I do not mean to indicate that we should have such a degree of preparedness, or that we should prepare in such a spirit as to justify the charge of militarism, but only to such an extent and in such a manner as to secure that rational and reasonable degree of preparedness which will render us able promptly and effectively to defend our-

selves, our interests, and our institutions against aggression.

I have stated plainly in official reports, which are public documents and open to your inspection and use, my views and recommendations in the way of preparedness, the necessity of preparation in time of peace, and the impossibility of making preparation after war has once commenced, at least without such delay as would result in great and unnecessary losses.

While entertaining the highest opinion of the soldierly qualities of the American, it can be stated that those who know what war is realize that to send the youth of this country, untrained and unprepared, into war means a needless and wanton waste of life. It means more, — it means that the lessons of history have not been taken to heart.

Even in the early days of the Republic, when our territorial possessions were limited to a relatively small portion of this continent, when transportation overseas was slow and dangerous, and wars came slowly, when our possible

enemies were unprepared to strike promptly and our people were still to a large extent used to the rifle and accustomed to take care of themselves in camp and forest, even then our early Presidents saw clearly the danger incident to unpreparedness and urged upon Congress in message after message reasonable measures of preparation.

Washington, in his first annual address, stated: —

> To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined, to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite.

Again: —

> The safety of the United States, under Divine protection, ought to rest on the basis of systematic and solid arrangements, exposed as little as possible to the hazards of fortuitous circumstances.

President Adams said: —

> But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we should give no room for any fear

that we abandon the desire of peace. An efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace.

Thomas Jefferson, in his fifth annual message, advocated: —

> The organization of three hundred thousand able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six for offense or defense, at any time or any place where they may be wanted.

In a letter to Monroe he advocated compulsory military service in the following words: —

> We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens . . . and make military instruction a part of collegiate education.

And again: —

> If war be forced upon us in spite of our long and vain appeals to the justice of nations, rapid and vigorous movement at the outset will go far toward securing us in its course and issue and throwing its burdens on those who render necessary the resort from reason to force.

The principles laid down in these messages are just as sound to-day as they were when uttered, and they are even more pertinent in all which relates to a reasonable degree of pre-

paredness, for wars now come much more quickly.

That a rational degree of preparedness is not inconsistent with American institutions and ideals is clearly indicated in the last message of President Wilson, in which he states: —

> It will be right enough, right American policy, based on our accustomed principles and practices, to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps.
>
> We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline which our young men will learn to value. It is right that we should provide it not only, but that we should make it as attractive as possible, and so induce our young men to undergo it at such times as they can command a little freedom and can seek the physical development they need, for health's sake, if for nothing more.

I know that your purpose in writing these articles and in amplifying them in book form is to concentrate the attention of our people upon that side of national life and responsibility which we hear little of. I mean reasonable

preparation for defense to an extent consistent with our ideals and institutions. While we do not want militarism it seems to me most desirable that we should secure that degree of military preparedness which is found in Switzerland and is now being established in Australia, and that we can study with advantage the methods employed in these countries. In doing this we shall better American citizenship and manhood in that such training will result in the physical improvement of our youth, a higher regard for the rights of others, and a fuller appreciation of each man's duty to the State.

Very sincerely,

LEONARD WOOD.

ARE WE READY?

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CHAPTER I

GOLD AND IRON

He was a clean-limbed, clean-minded, clean-blooded young American. By virtue of two very hard fists, one very active brain, and average American pluck, he had pounded his way to the top of his own particular pile. When I saw him last, he was slouched dejectedly on a narrow wooden bench in a little coop in the corner of a prize-ring enclosure in San Francisco — a much-battered youth, absently pressing the back of a swollen, bandaged hand against badly puffed lips. The usual bevy of fight experts were grouped around him, eyeing him critically, pumping questions at him. Finally they prodded him into speech. This is what he said: "Aw, I never got started. He's a mark. I'll knock his head off the next time I get him in a ring with me." Up to now, there

has been no "next time." The mauling the lad received shoved him from the top of the heap to the ranks of the "second-raters." He never got back. "Under-training, over-confidence, and carelessness" was the verdict of the "experts." He had the "class," they agreed, but the other lad "beat him to the punch."

All of which may or may not have anything whatever to do with the question of whether the United States of America is prepared for war with a first-class foreign power. It all depends on the way you look at it, or whether you bother yourself to look at it at all.

Since the present conflict in Europe demonstrated the terrific possibilities of international disputes and exposed the horrible perfection of modern scientific warfare, there is not one of us, it is probably safe to say, who has not had his moments of speculation, more or less vague, as to whether, just in case . . .

Our military experts for years, particularly since our trouble with Spain, when some rather startling difficulties presented themselves, in the way of putting where they were needed

men and guns (and the things to put into men and guns), have been hammering and hammering on their arguments that we are not prepared for trouble, and that there is peril in our unpreparedness. Largely because these men are experts, perhaps, and therefore to the lay mind over-zealous and over-fearful, they have not been able to plant in the general run of us any very serious doubts as to our security here at home. We are a very young, a very busy, and a very confident people.

Whether or not our confidence and our sense of security are justified, it is a fact that investigation will immediately reveal facts previously not guessed at or at any rate not fully grasped. I set this fact down because it was only recently that I completed just such an investigation. It was undertaken for the purpose of placing before the non-professional, unexpert American the facts of our preparedness for war, as found by a writer who approached his task with no preconceived notions or theories of war save the universal American sentiment against militarism, and a conviction that mod-

ern warfare will, some day, be looked upon as a wasteful and ridiculous means of expressing patriotism and advancing national hardihood, just as to-day we regard burning witches as a wasteful and ridiculous means of expressing faith and advancing religion.

If 200,000 fighting men of any first-class hostile power should be landed on our Pacific Coast to-night, we should have no course save regretfully to hand over to a foreign nation the rich empire west of the Rockies, with its cities, its harbors, and the wealth of its valleys and mountains.

If war were to be declared against us to-day, with portions of our regular army in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and elsewhere, we could throw not more than 50,000 men into line of battle. With the utmost energy on the part of our officers, running our military machinery at top speed, it would take us at least six weeks to increase this force to 150,000 men.

A successful defense of our long coast line, in case of an attempted hostile invasion, would

TWENTIETH UNITED STATES INFANTRY IN MANEUVERS AT FORT BLISS, TEXAS

require at least 300,000 men backed by a trained field army of not less than half a million men. We are wholly unprepared to assemble any such defensive force.

Sudden invasion at this time would mean the certain loss of our coast cities, to be regained only at an enormous cost of lives and treasure.

Of the very limited estimate of 1300 field guns for our army, we have only between 700 and 800 built. If all our guns were put into action at once, there is not enough ammunition in the country for an engagement lasting a single day.

These are all facts, agreed upon by the ablest military minds of the nation. There are many more just as interesting.

Are they important?

Is a trained force of 50,000 men within our borders ample at this time?

Is an invasion of the United States possible or feasible?

Could a foreign nation profit by it? If so, how?

On the premise that we can be forced into a war with a powerful, perfectly equipped, and thoroughly prepared foe and confronted with the immediate necessity of repelling an invasion, what then?

Can we provide an adequate defensive force, ready for action on short notice?

If not immediately, is it possible to provide against such an emergency in the future without adopting some sort of system of militarism, hateful to us, contrary to our best traditions? If so, how?

It all sounds a good deal like an examination paper. Well, perhaps it is. Perhaps the American people will find it worth while at this time to work out the answers.

The "first punch" is considered to be as important in the military art as it is in the manual of the prize ring. This, probably, was never more clearly shown than at the opening of the present war in Europe. That Wilhelm's first "straight right" was blocked, then countered, was due to no lack of preparation, train-

ing, or agility on his part, but to the fact that the other fellow, if not wholly prepared, was sufficiently alert to be able to block, to weather the first furious assault, and to wait for an opening for a heavy counter.

The initial advantage of war is always with the aggressor.

Major-General Leonard Wood, former Chief of Staff of our army, in a recent interview I had with him, illustrated this point this way: —

If an acquaintance has fully decided that it is necessary and advisable that he give you a thorough beating, he alone knows most of the vital details that go into what is coming your way. First of all, he knows of his decision. You do not. He knows precisely where he is going to hit you, when and how he will deliver the attack. You know none of this. What is more, he is not going to wait until you have begun to take boxing lessons. If you know that his attitude is not altogether friendly, you are lucky; and the best you can do is to keep your eyes open, your courage up, and your wind good.

Whether this great military man's illustration applies to the position of the United States among the nations of the world is of course de-

batable. Whether we are likely to become the object of the sinister designs of a foreign power is a subject which we have entrusted to the gentlemen and ladies whom we hire to keep their ears to the ground — our secret service and our diplomatic corps. This much, however, may be said: —

Since the close of the Civil War, when there were in the United States about 1,500,000 men under arms, to the present, when we have a mobile army of about 32,000 men ready, as a nation we have been steadily advancing our international position. Commercially, industrially, and politically we have been constantly becoming more important. Our responsibilities at home and abroad have increased in the ratio of our influence. Growing prosperity and power is a breeder of jealousies in nations as in men. Back of the European war is the latest demonstration of this.

Generally speaking, we are taking it for granted that because we do not want war we shall not have war. We argue: War is barbarous and futile. We are enlightened. Therefore

we shall not have war. The world's market is an open market. If increased productiveness and enterprise mean broader competition, we will compete. We will not fight.

Generally speaking, we are taking it for granted that we do, and shall continue to, control the Pacific.

Generally speaking, we are taking it for granted that we shall continue successfully to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, regardless.

Generally speaking, a nation emerging as conqueror from the present struggle in Europe, itself based upon several things taken for granted, would look upon itself, and not without reason, as fully justified in taking over the work of development and culture in more or less undeveloped regions — South America, for example.

"In the support of the Monroe Doctrine," a very able observer of international affairs said to me recently, "we must bear in mind that our stand has had the tacit support of Great Britain. Great Britain at present and for some years past has had a rather superior navy. We cannot see from where we sit how far the Euro-

pean frog is going to jump. We can form no accurate picture of what Great Britain and her navy, or any other nation and its navy, not to mention armies and purses, are going to look like when this war is over."

The statement, with its inference, is no doubt open to debate. There is no reason for presenting here an argument for or against.

As a broad proposition, however, may it not be said that there is at least a possibility that while we, chock-full of confidence, happy, healthy, and prosperous, go blithely whistling up and down the highways of the world, some other fellow, not quite so care-free and a little less opposed to a brawl, may be watching us with the cold eye of speculation?

Maybe there is a modern application of the hint that Solon dropped to Crœsus: "If another king comes who has better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold."

Over in Europe we are getting daily proof of the fact that it is one thing to thumb one's nose at one's neighbor and quite another thing to watch one's eye.

CHAPTER II

AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK

SUPPOSE: —

Portland, Me., March 12 — A destroyer arriving here with one of its funnels shot away, and half its crew dead or wounded, reports that in a terrific engagement on the east and west lines of trade, south of Newfoundland and off the Banks, the American main battle fleet has been partially destroyed by a superior squadron of the enemy. The surviving vessels are apparently seeking refuge in Boston and New York harbors, and Narragansett Bay.

Washington, March 12 — (Bulletin.) In a statement issued by the Government Press Bureau, the defeat of our main battle fleet is officially confirmed. The loss in ships and men is not given.

Bar Harbor, March 14 — A dispatch boat reports the presence of several war vessels, thought to be the enemy's scout cruisers, off

the Massachusetts coast. A neutral steamship reports that the enemy's fleet has reassembled in large numbers.

Boston, March 14 — A scout cruiser, arriving here at midnight, reported having picked up a code wireless from the flagship of the enemy's fleet, carrying the information that the American fleet had been beaten and scattered, and instructing the movement of transports toward the Atlantic Coast.

Austin, Texas, March 14 — The Governor has refused to transmit the President's call for militia. Rumors of impending raids by Mexican irregulars are active along the border.

Washington, March 15 — Semi-official reports, from New England coast cities, only partially confirmed, indicate the approach of a large fleet of transports, under heavy convoy.

New York, March 16 — The official news of the defeat of our main battle fleet in an engagement off the Newfoundland Banks, followed by the arrival to-day of several of our smaller warships which crept into port, all badly crippled and carrying hundreds of dead and wounded,

has brought conditions here to the verge of panic. Frightful stories told by survivors, many of whom are in a state of hysteria, published in early editions of the evening papers, all indicate a disaster appalling in its extent.

Rumors that a bombardment from the sea is imminent persist. Because of the seemingly hopeless confusion, mobilization of the militia is proceeding slowly in spite of the utmost efforts of the military authorities.

Martial law has been declared. The Mayor has issued a proclamation advising banks and business houses to remove funds and valuables to Albany. Fear of bomb-dropping raids by aeroplanes launched from hostile warships has intensified the terror. Street illumination has been prohibited. New York will be in darkness to-night. Whole blocks of shops are closed and deserted. Looters have been ordered shot at sight.

The Croton water supply is unprotected. The city officials have asked the Government for regular troops.

The tendency of civilians to rush frantically to arms without organization, trained officers, or adequate equipment is increasing confusion and adding to the difficulty of preparing for a land defense. Motor vehicles are being commandeered for the transport of troops, equipment, and supplies. Station platforms are littered with baggage which cannot be moved. Every train leaving the city is choked with refugees. Two women have been killed in a crush at the Grand Central Station.

Boston, March 16—A hundred or more persons, mostly women and children, were injured to-day, in a riot at the South Station. An unofficial report, published here, that Boston may expect a bombardment within the next forty-eight hours, has thrown the city into a panic. Thousands are leaving by rail, every description of vehicle, and on foot.

New York, March 16—The commander of an armored cruiser, who brought his crippled vessel into port last night, is quoted in an evening paper as saying: "The nature of the engagement, in which the enemy was successful in his

MADISON SQUARE, NEW YORK, AFTER AN AERIAL RAID
From a Drawing by Oliver Herford

first purpose, to destroy and scatter our fleet, makes anything but the most general estimate of our losses impossible. That the disaster is complete there can be no doubt. The American fleet fought with the most desperate courage. We have lost our most powerful vessels. Our defeat can be attributed to our inferiority in number of ships, in speed, in number of heavy guns, to lack of battle practice, and to shortage of men. We were hopelessly outweighed at long-range fighting."

Washington, March 16 — Official Washington is stunned at the extent of our naval disaster as indicated in the fragmentary details confirmed up to this time. The official statement of our losses is not expected for several days. A comparison of reports makes it evident that a third of our fighting ships have been destroyed and that the rest have been so badly crippled that they cannot go into action until they are overhauled.

New York, March 16 — The central office of a press association reports that every important center on the Atlantic seaboard, from Galves-

ton to Portland, is frantically appealing to the Government for troops.

Boston, March 16 — The hostile fleet has been picked up by a dispatch boat 150 miles off Cape Cod, headed west and steaming slowly. It could not be determined whether the fleet is making for Boston or New York. It is the evident purpose of the commander to conceal his objective until the troops reported to be approaching under convoy shall arrive.

Panama, March 16 — The Governor General has reported to Washington that steamers arriving at Colon have sighted hostile cruisers in the Caribbean. He has forwarded an urgent request that troops in the Canal Zone be increased and that an adequate ammunition supply be established at once. Preparations for the defense of the Canal are inadequate.

Washington, March 17 — Reports from various States indicate that the President's call for 500,000 volunteers has met with instant response. The greatest difficulty is being experienced in the effort to assemble, organize, and equip the recruits. It has developed that

there are practically no officers available for organizing and training. The total lack of even a partially trained reserve for filling out the essential branches of an effective field force presents the gravest problems. There is an alarming shortage of cavalry, signal, engineering, hospital, and field artillery equipment. The total available supply is hardly adequate for the regular army and more or less complete militia organizations. Reports made public indicate that both the regular army and the militia are lacking in organization and equipment. All the available coast artillery reserves have been sent to the fortifications along the Atlantic Coast. This will supply about half the men needed at the guns.

New York, March 17 — The mobilization of the regular army in the Albany district is complete. With the troops from the Mexican border, withdrawn in spite of vigorous protests by Texas authorities and by several border cities, a force of 20,000, organized as a full division, is concentrated in the military camps. One division of cavalry is *en route*.

San Francisco, March 17 — A mass meeting was held here to-night to protest against the militia leaving California. The presence of what are believed to be hostile warships off the southern California coast is persistently rumored. The coast artillery has been brought to its full war strength. The artillery reserves have been brought in.

Washington, March 18 — It is the consensus of opinion of army and navy heads that the enemy intends to strike in the region between Washington and Boston. A high army officer, whose name is withheld, is quoted as expressing the belief that New York, because it is one of the most vulnerable of our large cities and would be most effective as a base of operations, and because, as the center of our arteries of commerce, its fall would have a paralyzing effect on the nation, has been selected for the initial attack.

Washington, March 18 — In spite of vigorous efforts to muster every available man during the two weeks that have elapsed since the President's call for militia, the figures made

public to-day are startlingly low. Reports from every State are in, and indicate that the militia cannot be mobilized at more than forty per cent of its war strength. At the present rate of mobilization, and with several States refusing to allow militia to leave, it is estimated that at least six weeks must elapse before a force of 150,000 men can be concentrated for defense. Unless men who have had service in foreign armies come to our assistance, this force will remain untrained. The shortage of field artillery, cavalry, equipment, and trains is almost incredible. The greatest shortage is in field artillery, by far the most important auxiliary in infantry operations. This arm of the service has not sufficient ammunition at hand for more than a brief action. It has developed that New York has the only complete divisional organization. The total shortage, should the concentration of our available militia be accomplished, is estimated as follows: 80 batteries of field artillery; 70 troops of cavalry; 17 companies of engineers; 26 field hospitals; 30 ambulance companies; 12 ammunition

trains; 12 supply trains; 12 pack trains. For the most part the militia is supplied with a 3-inch light field gun only.

Washington, March 18 — All the Atlantic States, as well as Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, have flatly refused to allow their militia to leave. The President's military advisers are reported to be urging him to order the concentration of militia over the heads of those governors who are refusing to transmit his call. It is admitted that should such an order be resisted, it could be enforced only through process of law. The commanding officers of the North and South Atlantic districts are greatly exercised over the lack of coast-guard troops to protect the detached harbors, fire-control stations, and military works.

Harrisburg, March 18 — The Governor has agreed to send the Pennsylvania militia to the Albany region. The militia is practically without field artillery and other equipment necessary to field service.

Springfield, March 18 — The Massachusetts

SIGNAL CORPS MAN

militia has finally been ordered to Albany. It is poorly equipped. Its transportation is improvised, every description of vehicle having been pressed into its ammunition and supply trains. It is, necessarily, proceeding slowly.

Washington, March 18 — (Bulletin.) The President has ordered the militia of every State to mobilize in the Albany district.

New York, March 21 — An American scout cruiser, arriving here, reports having sighted a large fleet of transports approaching the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound.

Washington, March 21 — (Bulletin.) Under cover of a night fog, the coast artillery force on Fisher's Island was overpowered and the big guns rendered useless in a raid last night by a strong landing force of the enemy, according to an official statement issued by the Press Bureau to-day. A smaller force, with field guns brought from the warships, landed on the eastern side of Watch Hill, drove off the defenders of Fort Mansfield, and destroyed the mechanism of the guns, according to the same official report.

New London, March 21 — (Bulletin.) A large number of troop ships under heavy convoy are entering Long Island Sound from the east. Troops are evidently about to be landed on the Connecticut shore east of here. Advance bodies of the hostile forces are momentarily expected. The city is rapidly becoming deserted. Terror-stricken inhabitants are leaving by hundreds.

Washington, March 21 — The following official statement has been issued by the War Department: "Troops in large force are being landed from the enemy's transports at a point east of New London. Advices from the vicinity of the invaded area are that United States regulars with a small force of militia offered a short resistance. They were driven back by the guns of the warships. With the hostile troops are being landed field artillery, several heavy guns, apparently of the siege type, and large quantities of supplies and ammunition. An aerial squadron has apparently been landed in Fort Pond Bay near Montauk Point, where the work of assembling aeroplanes is reported to

be under way. Infantry and field artillery have also been landed at this point, according to the same report, indicating that the enemy plans a movement through Long Island. Telegraphic communication with New London has been severed. Reports from Waterford, Montville, and Chesterfield indicate that large bodies of troops are being pushed forward rapidly. The New York, New Haven & Hartford lines have been seized. It is evidently the enemy's intention to advance as rapidly as possible in order to hold the bridges toward New York. A strong detachment has been sent out in the direction of Boston with the apparent object of interrupting railroad communication toward Boston."

Philadelphia, March 23 — It is reported from the Delaware Capes that a large fleet, apparently composed of transports, cruisers, and battleships, is headed for the Chesapeake. By order of the Governor, the movement of the Pennsylvania militia has been suspended.

New York, March 23 — The delay in the advance of the Pennsylvania militia, caused by

the rumor of a war fleet making for the Chesapeake, has caused the greatest embarrassment in the preparations for the defense of New York. The fleet reported in yesterday's dispatch is now known to consist of light cruisers and colliers. No hostile move toward the Chesapeake is apparently under way, according to the latest advices from Washington.

Washington, March 23 — A Press Bureau statement contains the opinion of naval and military authorities that the enemy will not risk his ships against coast defense guns and there is no immediate prospect of a bombardment of New York from the sea. They believe that he intends moving through Connecticut to cut off Boston and to attack New York from the rear of its fortifications. This move will render the coast defenses powerless. The big coast guns cannot be trained inland and cover the harbor entrances only. They are practically unprotected against a land attack. If the surmised movement through Long Island is correct, it means that the defenses at Willet's Point and Fort Hamilton will soon be in the

hands of the enemy. This would put Fort Slocum out of action and open up the eastern entrance to New York Harbor to small ships. The approach of additional troop transports is reported.

Boston, March 23 — Several hostile ships have fired long-range shots at Fort Revere, according to a dispatch from Gloucester. The Governor has requested that the Massachusetts militia be returned for the defense of Boston.

Washington, March 23 — The President has refused to allow the Massachusetts militia to return to Boston. Apparently he and his military advisers are convinced that the shots fired at Revere were intended to create panic and to weaken the defensive strength of our troops.

New York, March 24 — An aerial scout, who succeeded in reconnoitering over the Sound, reports the enemy's strength in the neighborhood of 150,000 men, with large quantities of field artillery, perfectly equipped supply, ammunition, and hospital trains, and several batteries of the heavy siege type. The force at

Montauk Point, as nearly as can be estimated, is about a division of all arms. He observed several aeroplanes aloft apparently trying to locate American troops. He reports the main body of the hostile infantry pressing forward toward Saybrook.

Our forces are known to be advancing rapidly, and it is believed that a desperate attempt will be made to check the enemy's advance at the Connecticut River. It is believed that the closing days of the month will see the first battle of the war being fought along the river between Hartford and Saybrook. Our total strength consists of one division of regulars, a cavalry brigade, one division of New York militia, and an incomplete division of Ohio and Wisconsin militia. Small arms have been secured from the arsenal on Governor's Island and Frankford Arsenal at Philadelphia sufficient for 10,000 volunteers. Without organization or sufficient officers, these recruits have been rushed to the support of the little army advancing toward Saybrook.

Washington, March 27 — The following offi-

cial statement was issued by the Press Bureau at noon to-day: —

The enemy has forced a crossing of the Connecticut River at both Saybrook and Middletown. Our troops are being forced northward, and before further resistance will be possible, they will have to join with the New England militia. The hostile invading force numbers in the neighborhood of 150,000 men, with an overwhelming superiority in artillery and equipment. Transports with heavy reinforcements are reported to be approaching. The New York municipal authorities have been notified that a successful defense of that city seems impossible.

All of this is pure speculation, to be sure.

Nevertheless, the speculation has a basis in facts which cannot be disputed. I have shown the manuscript of this chapter to several military experts and all agreed that under the conditions which I have imagined, with the city's fate hanging on a bare 50,000 men, and an unorganized, unofficered, and poorly equipped

force of volunteers, capture would be inevitable. They agreed that defense by citizens, under modern methods of warfare, would be hopeless, and pointed to the German operations in Belgium as proof of this. They agreed that a tremendous indemnity would doubtless be demanded, some placing it as high as $1,000,000,000, others still higher. None of them suggested that there was absurdity in the speculative treatment of the facts of our preparedness, and they were of one mind that if the events imagined should occur, the nation would face the immediate necessity of deciding whether it would pay an enormous monetary price for peace or whether it would enter into a long war to retake all that might be lost before hundreds of thousands of men and officers could be armed, trained, equipped, and put into the field.

Among the men with whom I discussed this chapter was Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War. After a close study of the manuscript Mr. Stimson permitted me to quote him as follows: —



HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War, 1911-1913

AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK

I have read "An Attack on New York." There is nothing said in it which is outside the bounds of modern military possibility. The facts with reference to our possible defensive force are accurately stated and the speculative treatment of them is logical.

The facts of our military preparedness, as they apply to the possibility of an attack on the Atlantic Coast, have an even more alarming bearing on any speculation touching the safety of our Pacific Slope.

Our General Staff and our War College have taken problem after problem, worked each one forward, backward, and sideways, conjured up every conceivable proposition touching attack and means of defense. In each case, eventually, the solution has been the same.

We cannot defend the Pacific Slope against a trained hostile force as small as 100,000 men.

It matters very little at what point the empire west of the Rockies might be invaded. In the opinion of military experts who have worked on the problems of the military defense of that portion of our territory, a suc-

cessful invasion might have as its first object the region of San Francisco Bay, of Puget Sound, or of Los Angeles.

There are many points on the Pacific Coast entirely outside the fire zone of the big harbor guns, where landing troops could be easily, quickly, and safely accomplished.

It is probable that a foe would select the San Francisco region for the initial point of invasion, although there is little or nothing upon which to base a theory that a hostile power would not land its fighting men at two or even three points at once.

With a portion of our fleet destroyed and the rest "bottled," transports could approach and land troops, guns, ammunition, and equipment at points either north or south of the city of San Francisco, — at Half Moon Bay, on the peninsula, for example, — or north of San Francisco at some point on the Marin County shore line. Small bays and inlets furnish many accessible points.

We could, and no doubt would, throw forward all our available line of defense across the

peninsula, if the attack came from the south, and north of the city of San Francisco, if troops should be landed in that region.

If the necessity came to-night for such a line or for both lines of defense, this is approximately what we should have at hand to go into it: —

Three thousand regular troops in California.

We should have three regiments of infantry at the Presidio of San Francisco, and one regiment of cavalry at Monterey. All the coast artillery troops would be needed at the guns. The only other mobile troops available along the whole long shore line would be two regiments of infantry — one at Portland, Oregon, the other at Seattle, Washington. The total of the regular mobile forces on the whole Pacific Coast would be six regiments at peace strength, or about 4500 men.

About 3500 men, indifferently trained, in the organized militia, short of field guns, without the necessary ammunition, supply, and hospital trains, and lacking in other necessities of actual field service, would make up our militia strength. The militia forces, estimated

from recent inspection figures, would be approximately as follows: —

Quartermaster Corps	2 officers, no men
Subsistence Department	1 officer, no men
Medical Department	20 officers, 90 men
Corps of Engineers	2 officers, no men
Ordnance	2 officers, no men
Signal Corps	4 officers, 69 men
Chaplains	3
Cavalry	10 officers, 170 men
Field Artillery	15 officers, 300 men
Infantry	140 officers, 2000 men
Coast Artillery Corps[1]	30 officers, 600 men

Our militia force, therefore, though well supplied for religious ministration, would have not more than 3500 men in its organization, and this number would include many non-combatants, both officers and men. Without doubt, militia from the region of Los Angeles and San Diego, as well as militia from the States of Oregon and Washington, would not be sent to the region of San Francisco because of the necessity of local defense.

An attack from the north by a strong force of trained men would, without question, result in the almost immediate capture of the north batteries of San Francisco Bay.

[1] Which cannot be counted in the mobile force.

The power of a so-called coast-defense battery is in exact ratio to the range of its heaviest gun within the radius of that gun's fire.

It is right there that we have been so blithely fooling ourselves, ever since some one called harbor-defense guns "coast-defense guns."

Without men defending them, the great guns mounted along our coast line are powerless against an attack by land. Big rifles, and heavy mortars, if big enough, heavy enough, and well handled, can prevent hostile entrance of our harbors.

Little rifles, small guns, and many men, all of them well handled, the men well trained, are necessary to protect our coast line against invasion.

When we speak of having a regular army of about 5000 officers and 88,000 men, we have to consider that approximately 19,000 of these officers and men belong to the coast artillery, and that other thousands are stationed outside the territorial borders of the United States, leaving an actual mobile army within the

United States of not more than 1500 officers and 30,000 men. The men who handle the big guns at the harbor entrances cannot be counted among those upon whom we can count to take part in an effort to repel an attack by land. The coast fortifications are local organizations, and are designed wholly to protect the more important of our seaports from direct naval attacks and raids, to guarantee against the landing of hostile troops at certain definite places, to safeguard our naval bases, in the absence of our own warships, to prevent the use of individual harbors and other landing-places as points which could be used for naval operations against us, and to secure places of safety for our war-vessels.

The total stretch of our coast line is enormous, and the portions of it covered by the guns in our harbor defenses are very limited in comparison with the unprotected intervals that lie between them.

Should we lose control of the sea, as has been assumed, it would be possible for a hostile power to commence an invasion by the simple

BIG GUNS AT FORT WADSWORTH, STATEN ISLAND, N.Y.

expedient of landing troops in one of these unprotected intervals, within easy striking distance of some important city. Should attack come from a nation having tens of thousands of reservists already within our borders, as part of our population, our fleet and our harbor defenses would be powerless to help us. Ultimate defense, therefore, can be accomplished only by having a sufficient mobile army equipped and trained to fight efficiently in any theater of war which an enemy may select. The complete defense of our coast line depends upon the combined efforts of our coast artillery and our mobile forces.

This fundamental difference between the coast artillery and the mobile portions of the army has not yet been recognized by our legislators, though the point has been hammered at constantly for years by our military men. Eventually, if we are to have a really efficient regular army organization, the mobile forces must be free to move on instant notice, and should not be tied down by peace administration in any particular locality. Our present

army post system is a direct violation in many instances of this principle. When the violation lies in the fact that, as in some instances, one commanding officer is in charge of both mobile and stationary troops, such a system of administration would, without doubt, break down in time of war.

It is the opinion of men who have given years of careful study to the subject that, for the defense of our Atlantic Coast alone in time of threatened invasion, we should require at least 300,000 trained men of all arms, organized into complete divisions. The question that army officers, cabinet officers, and members of our national legislature are asking is: —

"How can we get them?"

CHAPTER III

A BOTTLED NAVY

If our fleet is unbeatable, there is little sense or reason in speculation as to our readiness to repel invasion, or excuse for a volume such as this. No foreign enemy, unless able to strike directly from or through the territory north or south of us, would venture to attack us by land until he had destroyed our war power on the sea. In regarding the question of our military preparedness, therefore, if we ignore the possibility of direct attack by land, two assumptions are possible: —

We can assume that our fleet cannot be beaten. Or we can assume that it can.

Unintelligent patriotism immediately jumps to the first premise and proclaims that military strength is unimportant, and that any agitation looking toward increasing our land forces is jingoism.

Intelligent patriotism, the kind that is to be

found in our ablest soldiers and in many of our leading statesmen, holds to the second assumption, and insists that the safety of the nation demands that it be prepared both by land and sea. That is not to say that intelligent patriotism *admits* that our sea fighters can be conquered, but that it is willing to *assume*, in seeking to find what absolute safety demands, that our fleet can be rendered powerless to defend our shores.

This second assumption was the basis of the speculation in the preceding chapter. It is at the bottom of the contention that it will be profitable for the American people to consider the facts of our military preparedness. Whether or not this is warranted can be established only in actual warfare. In a discussion of our military strength, there is little space for an exhaustive analysis of our naval strength.

There are, however, certain general grounds, which it may be well to indicate at this point, for assuming that a naval defeat is possible.

Size alone cannot always be counted upon to win battles, as the schoolboy bully has often

discovered to his amazement and chagrin. So long as the issues of modern warfare are decided by explosives and projectiles, battles will be won and lost by superiority of fire. Larger numbers and bigger guns, greater weight and superior agility, all are distinct advantages; but the ultimate test lies in how the guns are handled, how well trained are the men behind them, and whether the agility is converted into fighting efficiency.

It is not our policy to excel all nations in greater numbers — of men, ships, or guns. We do make an effort, however, to keep ahead of all nations in the size of our guns. If under this policy we are able, under any circumstances, to maintain superiority of fire, both in volume and accuracy, we are justified in assuming that our navy is unconquerable. There are very definite grounds for seriously questioning such ability.

Throughout our history, the general trend of our naval policy has been weak. It has been "off again, on again, back again, Finnegan," with us.

We started the "little navy" policy immediately after the Revolution. Contrary to the advice of Washington, our navy was abolished and for eight years we had none. It was not until the outrageous decree of the Directory of France in 1796, followed by the capture of American vessels bound to and from English ports, that the necessity of fighting ships was driven home to us, and we established a sea power which forced peace. After the *Constellation* defeated the French frigate *Insurgente*, and strife on the sea was stopped, we went back again to our "little navy" policy. We soon found ourselves paying tribute to the pirates of Algiers. Once more we provided ourselves with warships and eventually the piracy was put down.

England's interference in 1807 with commerce between the United States and continental Europe should have warned us of the folly of our weak naval policy. Jefferson, without a navy, and with a distaste for war, persuaded Congress to pass the Embargo Act as a substitute for a navy. One historian has said

that "the cost of this experiment emptied the treasury, bankrupted the mercantile and agricultural classes, and ground the poor beyond endurance."

By 1811, it was plain as the nose on our face that we were rapidly moving, totally unprepared, toward war. When war was declared in 1812, we had six frigates and eight sloops, against the hundreds of ships in England's navy. We had three years of the War of 1812. We called out over 500,000 men and burdened ourselves with a large pension list. A hundred years after the war, there were still over two hundred widows on the pension roll of 1812. A strong naval policy at that time, if not actually preventing the war, would very probably have limited its duration to a few weeks or months.

It is interesting to consider the pension figures in connection with the argument of the "little navy" men that we cannot stand the expense of a larger navy. Up to 1914, the cost of pensions, due to the Civil War, had been about $4,000,000,000. The pension appro-

priation for 1913 was in the neighborhood of $185,000,000. This is about $50,000,000 more than was appropriated in the same year for the navy. Since we began to be the United States of America, we have paid $1,250,000,000 more for pensions than we have paid out for our navy. How much of this enormous sum a strong naval policy would have saved us can only be guessed at.

No one seriously questions the assertion, frequently made, that had the Northern States in 1861 been possessed of an adequate navy, there would not have been four years of cruel and costly conflict. With a navy of adequate proportions, the Norfolk Navy Yard would have been seized, the Mississippi would have been blockaded, and the export of cotton and the importation of war material from other nations would have been prevented. The exploits of the *Alabama* and other vessels which were built in English ports would have been impossible.

If Russia in 1905 had been able to assemble a sufficiently strong fleet at Port Arthur, Japan

would not have dared to send transports to China and to land troops. Turkey's naval weakness, in the recent war with Italy, opened the way for the Italian Navy to seize Tripoli without being punished. Turkey was unable to prevent Italy's command of the Mediterranean.

To-day, England with a navy of superior strength, has been able to completely paralyze Germany's over-sea trade, which last year amounted to close to $4,000,000,000. England's navy is one of the great elements which experts are taking into consideration as a factor that will weigh heavily in bringing hostilities in Europe to an end.

It should be remembered, however, that, with all her sea power, England, without the allied armies, was and is powerless to prevent Germany from overrunning Belgium and France, or any other territory open to direct attack by land. England's weakness is like the weakness of the professional bowler — abnormal development. If her strong arm should be broken, she would be out of the

running. In a game requiring the service of the weaker arm, she is outclassed by her rivals. That real war strength must include military as well as naval power is true of any nation. We are no exception.

The official figures of 1914 show that the navy of the United States ranks third among the powers of the world, with France and Japan fourth and fifth. If our naval programme is carried out, the United States Navy soon will have dropped to fourth place, if, in actual fighting strength, it is not already there. These same figures give the French Navy 2406 officers and the Japanese Navy 3230 officers, with the United States a bad fifth, with 1918 officers. They show that in enlisted men we rank ahead of Japan by 2500 men and behind France by 10,000 men. Japan has 96 enlisted men per 1000 tonnage, compared with 69 men for the same tonnage in the American Navy. In ten years, Japan increased her naval expenditures eleven-fold, while the expenditures of the United States, on its navy, only doubled within the fifteen years ending with 1914. The

German expenditures tripled within the same period.

Josephus Daniels, as Secretary of the Navy, gave voice to the principle that "we are not building against anybody." He expressed the belief that the war in Europe is going to exhaust the resources of the countries engaged, and that there "is less likelihood of our having any trouble at any time in the future with those nations than there was before." This view concerns a point over which there is the widest divergence of opinion. It involves purely the question of size and weight.

George von L. Meyer, Mr. Daniels's predecessor as Secretary of the Navy, takes an opposite view. His opinion is this: —

> Better no navy whatever than a navy that is insufficient to our needs, and which only deceives the ignorant and inexperienced public as to its safety from attack or circumstances which would result in a paralyzing foreign commerce.
>
> It is impossible and unnecessary for this country to have a large standing army in competition with those across the seas. But it is possible and necessary for us to have a navy that is superior

to that of any country, with the exception of England.

To bring that about we must have a definite and continuous building programme of four battleships a year until we have secured an ultimate battleship strength of forty-eight ships of the line, with the necessary auxiliaries.

We also need a merchant marine as an adjunct to the navy, which in times of peace will carry the mails and our products to the foreign markets of the world.

England's merchant marine has been of incalculable value to her in the present crisis, and, while with us, the transportation of troops by water would probably be limited, it would require a large fleet of merchant steamers, of which this country is very deficient, to transport, in case of war, merely the necessary quantities of coal, oil, naval supplies, and ammunition.

We should insist on a strong navy. Battleships are cheaper than battles. The sea is a highway for a strong navy — a closed path to a weak one. Invasion of a country cannot be effected in the face of a superior fleet. The fleet is the navy. In war nothing fails like failure.

A powerful navy is the cheapest insurance.

The factors that go into any nation's naval strength are ships, men, guns, ammunition,



GEORGE VON L. MEYER
Secretary of the Navy, 1909-1913

and administration. If we insist that our naval programme, as it relates to the number, size, and armament of the ships which we maintain, is sufficient to guarantee our security, we have left the important elements of men, ammunition, and administration. That we are short of both men and officers to man our war-vessels is generally admitted. Our shortage of blue-jackets is about 15,000, and we are totally without reserve strength to replace losses in battle, to man our second-line ships, or to supply the necessary men for manning the new ships which our naval programme calls for.

That we are short of ammunition is another defect in our navy, which can be easily remedied. We have but one torpedo, for example, for each tube in our navy. We could not give a foe "the other barrel" if he were looking right into the muzzle of our gun. We need not only enough ammunition for a protracted engagement, but a sufficient quantity in reserve to insure us against shortage during any reasonable period of naval conflict. It is a most

disconcerting thing to have the hammer of your gun go down on an empty chamber.

Quick mobilization, in time of war or threatened war, is as important at sea as on land. The persistent and continuous refusal of Congress to abolish our numerous and unnecessary navy yards is in line with the costly and useless maintenance of our scattered army posts. It is the opinion of naval experts that highest efficiency demands that we have not more than three naval bases on the Atlantic, and three on the Pacific Coast. On the Atlantic Coast, it is advocated that our war-vessels should be concentrated at Hampton Roads, Narragansett, and Guantanamo, and that the Pacific naval bases should be Puget Sound, San Francisco, and Hawaii.

Given sufficient ships, sufficient guns, and sufficient ammunition, and means of quick mobilization, the administration of our fighting craft, and the men aboard them, remains as the great element involving efficiency.

Under our law, our Secretary of the Navy is not permitted to have a staff. He can, how-

ever, if he desires, surround himself with aides who have had actual experience as sea fighters.

Former Secretary Meyer was inclined toward administration through coöperation with advisers. Secretary Daniels showed an inclination toward greater concentration of administration in the Secretary of the Navy himself. It was Secretary Meyer who detailed officers to investigate and to keep him informed on the four essential divisions of naval affairs; operations, personnel, material, and inspection.

Under Meyer, the work on the problems involved in operations was performed by the best strategists in the navy. Those entrusted with keeping the Secretary informed on matters of personnel were kept at work on questions concerning the supply of officers and men, and the selection of men to perform the varied duties that go into the making up of a fleet. Such matters as the type of ships needed, and the various engineering problems that go into the building of a warship, were turned over to the aide entrusted with questions of material. The Secretary of the Navy was kept fully

informed of the condition of ships in service and ships building through the aide in charge of inspection.

Secretary Daniels, in large measure, abandoned this system, as well as the custom of having five instead of four battleships in a division, with one constantly in dry dock for altering and repair. A naval division contains four battleships. The object of so dividing the fleet that there would be five was to provide a system whereby the battleships in each division might at all times be in the best possible condition. Something of a luxury, on the face of it, perhaps. So is an extra pair of trousers. But any tailor will testify to the better appearance, longer life, and all-round greater serviceability of a suit with an "extra."

A college football team would not be conceded the remotest chance of success if it went into a game without having had team and signal practice. Although fleet practice is conceded to be an essential of efficient naval force, for some reason we seem to have taken a position that our fleet is an exception. We have

not had our warships out for extensive practice for three years. At the time of this writing, a period of such training is in contemplation; but if our fleet were called out to-day to repel a naval attack, there is not the question of a doubt that there would be a costly if not a disastrous lack of teamwork. The "pulling" of "bones" can work as much havoc on the sea as on the gridiron or diamond.

Battle maneuvers on paper and in textbooks are all well enough in their way, but they are not enough to place a fleet on an even footing with an enemy of equal strength, well trained in the actual handling of his warships.

We pride ourselves on the marksmanship of our gunners, but we are apt to overlook the fact that our high scores have been made under the most favorable conditions, — in calm seas, and without the strain that comes in battle. The recent naval battle off the coast of Chili was a clear demonstration of the value of the German system of holding fleet and target practice in rough seas and under the most unfavorable conditions.

The American people may ultimately decide how large our fleet is to be. For the present the immediate necessities are: —

Sufficient men to handle the ships and guns which we now have;

Sufficient men and officers to take the place of those lost in war and to man the ships now building;

Sufficient ammunition to supply our guns and enough in reserve to supply new ships and to meet the demands of naval warfare;

Supply ships, such as colliers, oil ships, and ammunition carriers, to meet the demands of our present fleet in war;

Equipment for aerial scouting;

Battle practice, sufficient to bring our sea-fighting machinery to maximum efficiency;

A good general staff.

It may be that we have an unbeatable navy. Whether we have or not, only a war with a first-class power will demonstrate. There surely is sufficient ground in a time of peace, such as this, however, to set us to wondering whether it is possible that the sea defense of

our country might be partially destroyed or bottled up in our harbors, to an extent which would enable an enemy to land troops on our shores and throw the burden of defense upon our military organizations.

Many of us are falling into the error of assuming that sea defense means stringing our warships along our coast line to prevent an enemy from nosing into our harbors, shelling our cities, or landing troops at unfortified points, and are losing sight of the fact that a war fleet to be most effective must strike an enemy in waters vital to him, outside the trade routes of its own nation, leaving the folks at home free to continue trade with their neighbors.

As a nation, we are assuming that the Monroe Doctrine is an established policy, that the national interest demands that we shall control the Pacific just as England now controls the Atlantic, and that we shall be able to prevent an enemy from landing troops on our shores. We are exhibiting a tendency to overlook the fact that the Monroe Doctrine is just

as strong as our fleet; that our power to enforce international agreements is as great as the weight of our guns; that our grip on the Pacific is as strong as the ships we can float on that ocean in case of necessity; and that whether we are "building against" any other nation or not, an enemy can land troops on our shores unless we have ships, guns, and men, sufficient in number and training to meet any emergency.

CHAPTER IV

THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET

I THINK the worst regular beating I ever got in my life was the result of the misapplication of a thoroughly sound military policy.

In the small town of my youth there was a very healthy and an exceedingly active bunch of young Americans. We gloried in the label of "The Hillside Avenue Gang." In the same town there was a "dude." He was our pet aversion, partly because we had a natural antipathy for the genus, and partly because he had related to our parents, with unnecessary detail, many things, including an assorted collection of words and phrases over which, so far as outsiders were concerned, we exercised the strictest censorship.

Came a time of thirst for revenge; came long conferences of the whole as a strategy board; an advance force, to hold the "dude's" attention — then an assault *en masse*. That was

it — a strategy as old as Napoleon, and a lot older.

Largely because I had established a reputation as a middling straight shot, partly because my armament was to be a carefully selected assortment of rather sickly and very squashy oranges, and partly because of a varied experience in matters such as that in hand, I was honored by being singled out for the advance force. I dislike to put the mark of approval on my military achievements; but I will say that I discharged in a highly efficient manner the duties laid upon me. My courage never faltered, my strategy ran like clockwork, and my range-finding was perfect. The opening shots, considered so vital to our cause, went home.

But my support expected too much of me. Instead of taking advantage of the temporary confusion of the enemy, the main force hesitated, backed and filled, pulled this way and that, refused to heed the commands of the officers, until I had been overborne by superior speed, weight, and endurance (that "dude"

was no slouch), and the whole plan was spoiled, with the enemy in full possession of the field, before the gang had made up its mind on any definite line of action. The great battle had to be left for another day.

Now all of this has a real bearing on a very serious fact — that a courageous and efficient regular army of less than 90,000 men, no matter how well armed, how well trained, how courageous, or how physically fit, is a mighty slim protection for this country.

The traditional military policy of the United States contemplates a small regular army as a nucleus in time of peace for a great army of citizen soldiers as the ultimate force in time of war.

This policy, based upon a theory declared by economists, statesmen, and military experts to be sound, both economically and politically, really dates back to the days following the Revolution. The foundation of our existing army was laid in the Act of September 29, 1789, which recognized an "establishment for the troops in the service of the United States"

and required all officers and men in such an establishment to take the oath of allegiance.

The first general organization of the army under the Constitution took place under the Act of April 30, 1790, which fixed the strength of non-commissioned officers and privates at 1216, enlisted for a term of three years.

The Miami expedition painfully demonstrated the inefficiency of so small an establishment, and on March 3, 1791, another regiment was added with a strength of 912 men. St. Clair's defeat was followed in 1792 by an act which provided for three additional regiments of infantry and for filling the battalion of artillery and the two existing regiments of infantry then in service to the legal maximum.

There is not space here to trace the growth of this little force into the present organization of the regular army. Through the record of our military legislation, however, there runs distinctly the policy of restricting the regular force of the United States to the smallest proportions consistent with efficiency and the national safety. Through all the records runs

also that assumption that in time of war the small peace establishment shall be nothing more than the nucleus for great forces of citizen soldiery.

How nearly we come to satisfactory application of our traditional policy in the matter of combination of professional fighting men and citizen soldiers will be taken up in succeeding chapters.

It would appear to a man up a tree that, if the nation should suddenly be confronted by war, and should depend for its safety upon a trained military nucleus intended to expand into a great defensive force, that nucleus is a very important thing.

Whether such a view is or is not correct, it is a fact that every year we spend in the neighborhood of ninety million dollars for less than ninety thousand men and officers in our regular army.

Ninety million dollars for ninety thousand soldiers is more — per head — than any other nation in the world pays for its army — from two to five times more. (You can figure the

average cost of a United States regular, officer and private, anywhere from eight hundred to two thousand dollars a year, according to what you put in or take out of the War Department figures. If, for example, you charge the cost of building the Panama Canal and the River and Harbor Pork Barrel, the cost tag on your soldier will be away over a thousand dollars. But if you figure only what goes into his actual fighting ability, the average will be close to a thousand.)

To be sure, the difference between the cost of our soldier and the cost of the soldier of other first-class nations can be charged largely, though not by any means wholly, to higher pay, higher cost of food, clothing, and other necessities that go into the soldier's maintenance, and the higher cost of his transportation.

But even if the average cost of our soldier were not greater than that of the soldier of other great powers, there is still the fact that against the ninety thousand trained men of our regular army which we could immediately put into the field in time of war, including the

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OUR THOUSAND-DOLLAR SOLDIER

thirty or forty thousand regulars we could promptly assemble on the continent, Germany, at the beginning of the present war, had four million trained men ready, and France nearly that many.

As a business proposition, unless we admit that we are colossal spendthrifts, the conclusion has to be either that our theories of the home defense — or their application — are all wrong, or that there are prodigious leaks somewhere.

The truth of it is that our theories are all right; that our application of them is all wrong; and that, for a nation with a reputation for hard-headed business sense, there *are* the most astonishing leaks.

The problem of the organization of our regular army has both a dynamic and a political aspect. It has been said that battles may be won and lost in the dome of the Capitol as well as on the field of battle. The military man may be at fault in proposing measures for adequate defense that would be intolerable to the American citizen, while the political expert may pro-

pose systems and schemes of organization which may be ridiculously impracticable and ineffective.

The ultimate test, of course, is the capacity of the armed body to exert a superior military force in time to meet successfully any hostile pressure that is brought to bear against it.

The numerical strength of our standing army is fixed at 100,000 men and officers.

On June 30, 1914, according to the report of the Secretary of War, its actual strength was 4701 officers, and 87,781 men, including 3809 men in the Quartermaster Corps, and 4055 men in the Hospital Corps. These figures represent the peace footing of the United States Army. In time of war, an infantry company now having 65 men, should have 150 men; a cavalry troop, which now has 71 men, should have 100 men; an artillery battery, with a present strength of 133 men, should have 190 men. No provision in the way of reserve strength has been provided for filling out our army from its peace to its war propositions. These forces

are, and so long as our responsibilities outside the continental limits of the United States continue, must be divided into two parts: troops on service beyond the territorial limits, and troops on service within the territorial limits. At present it is necessary for us to maintain forces in the Philippines, Panama, Oahu, Alaska, Guantanamo, and Porto Rico.

Increasing responsibilities outside the continental limits have necessitated distribution of our mobile forces approximately in the following manner: —

In the Philippines, $3\frac{1}{3}$ regiments infantry, 2 regiments cavalry, 1 regiment field artillery, 2 companies engineers, 11 companies coast artillery (aggregate strength 9572). In the Hawaiian Islands, 3 regiments infantry, 1 regiment cavalry, 1 regiment field artillery, 1 company engineers, 8 companies coast artillery (aggregate strength, 8195). In the Canal Zone, 1 regiment infantry, 3 companies coast artillery (aggregate strength, 2179). In China, 2 battalions infantry (aggregate strength, 849). In Alaska, 1 regiment infantry, (aggregate strength, 862). In Porto Rico, a 2-battalion regiment infantry (strength, 707). In United States, 17 regiments infantry, $11\frac{10}{12}$ regiments

cavalry, $3\frac{1}{2}$ regiments field artillery, 2 battalions engineers, 148 companies coast artillery (aggregate strength, 68,669). Troops *en route* and officers at other foreign stations, 1449.

And that is not all. In the near future it is going to be necessary to take from the United States and put in the Philippines 1950 men of the coast artillery; in the Hawaiian Islands, 6380 men, including infantry, field artillery, and coast artillery; and along the Panama Canal, 4774 men, including infantry, cavalry, field artillery, engineers, and coast artillery. When the necessary distributions are made, we shall have left within the continental limits of the United States, 12,610 coast artillery troops, and 28,692 mobile troops. This whole force is a little more than twice the size of the police force of the City of New York.

All of those groups stationed in foreign possessions, depend upon communication by sea with the central government. In time of war, therefore, they would have to be self-supporting until the navy should have secured command of the sea. Until naval supremacy should

be decided, there would be no opportunity for their expansion.

The contrary is the case with the troops within the territorial limits of the United States. Theoretically, our troops at home, while being maintained on a plan to insure highest efficiency together with maximum mobility, should have the backing of a condition which would make certain speedy and orderly expansion from the body of the citizenship into whatever force an emergency might demand.

Our regular army, while serving as a national police force, for administration and for instruction and training of citizen forces, should be able, in time of sudden need, to do for the nation what the Belgian army did for the Allies — to serve as the line of immediate defense, the stopgap to provide the few vital days of assembling a great defensive force of citizens.

With ninety million dollars to spend, it would seem that we should be able to provide ourselves with a regular army which would be the last word in efficiency. Yet if the need came

to-night, as has been shown, we could put into the field a mobile force of a scant 32,000 men, indifferently equipped in artillery and with a supply of artillery ammunition hardly sufficient for a day's engagement.

Behind this condition are wholly avoidable efficiency wastes and money wastes. The necessity of distributing troops in widely separated places and at great distances, the consequent cost of transportation of men, equipment, and supplies, with the added necessity, because of climatic conditions, of frequent changes of troops — all are highly expensive, and operate against quick mobilization. There is no doubt that there is a greater or less degree of waste in the routine of handling the administration and distribution of our regular forces; but since measures of economy and efficiency in these matters do not threaten to deprive any budding or blossomed statesman of his seat in Senate or House, constant progress is being made toward putting technical detail upon a thoroughly economic basis.

The big leak is the army post.

The army-post graft is first cousin to the navy-yard graft.

Genuinely patriotic American voters are really the grafters. Their representatives in Congress are the instruments.

The army post has become a big leak, ridiculously apparent and wholly avoidable, by reason of the desire of politicians in Congress to please a very limited portion of the folks who put them there, and to lend color to their "district loyalty" campaign utterances at what time they desire to be put there again.

Once we had big Indian troubles — people being terrorized, and scalped, and killed, and tortured in a lot of places. Now a murder by some whiskey-crazed redskin gets a "scarehead" in our metropolitan dailies.

Once we established many rough garrisons whose chief function was to protect white people from Indians. Now we have many elaborate army posts whose chief function is to make the green grass grow all around. They represent a great investment, on which no interest accrues; and they are very expensive to maintain.

ARE WE READY?

Back in 1911, along toward the close of the year, a Secretary of War, in his report to the President, made this statement: —

> The mobile army is distributed among forty-nine posts in twenty-four States and Territories. Nearly all of these posts have been located in their present situations for reasons which are now totally obsolete or which were from the beginning purely local. . . . Comparatively few of them are in positions suited to meet the strategic needs of national action or defense. . . . The posts have universally been constructed upon a plan which involves a maximum initial cost of construction and a maximum cost of maintenance both in money and men.

Now this Secretary of War — it was Henry L. Stimson — chanced to be a Republican. So, in accordance with our time-honored political traditions, a Democratic House started after him, passing a resolution demanding to know what he meant, if, by chance, he meant anything.

Some observers of the period will tell you that that House resolution was intended to scare the Secretary of War away from the army posts. However that may be, it is no

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FORT COOK, NEBRASKA: AN ARMY POST CONSTRUCTED AND MAINTAINED AT MAXIMUM COST

secret that he was besieged by Senators and Congressmen, who, in their great wisdom and long experience in such matters, urged him against the folly of a reply, begging that if he were really bent on making a chump of himself, he would refrain from dragging in posts in their particular neck of the woods. It is no secret, either, that he told them all: "You have asked for facts; now you are going to get facts" — or words to that effect.

It is tradition that if you wish to hide anything from the American people, the best place to put it is in an official report. It is too bad; for the official accounts of what followed are most interesting.

To the demand that he give "the names of all army posts which have been located in their present situations for reasons which are now totally obsolete," Stimson replied by calling the roll. He named Fort Apache, Arizona; Boisé Barracks, Idaho; Fort Clark, Texas; Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming; Fort Douglas, Utah; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Mackenzie, Wyoming;

Fort Meade, South Dakota; Fort Missoula, Montana; Fort Robinson, Nebraska; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Snelling, Minnesota.

When the Secretary of War came to the straight congressional demand that he declare the intentions of the War Department as to legislation it would urge, he came back with straight talk. He said — what to-day military experts agree in — that

If the mobile army is to be efficient its distribution must meet the following requirements: —

1. It must be favorable for the tactical training of the three arms combined (infantry, cavalry, and field artillery).

2. It must be favorable for the rapid concentration of the army upon our northern or southern frontier, or upon our eastern or western seaboard.

3. It must favor the best use of the army as a model for the general military training of the National Guard.

4. It must favor the use of the Regular Army as a nucleus for the war organization of the National Guard and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize to meet any possible military emergency.

5. The distribution must favor economical administration with the view of developing the maxi-

mum return for the money appropriated for military purposes.

6. The distribution must permit a peace organization which will also be effective in war; that is, an organization which will permit a prompt expansion in time of war by means of a system of reserve.

The conditions back of the recommendations made in 1911 have not materially changed. The fact that close to $6,000,000 could be saved the American people annually by the comparatively simple process of the concentration and redistribution of regular troops is still a fact.

Yet only four minor posts of the forty-nine have been abandoned. The United States Army, what of it is not in the Philippines, Panama, Oahu, Alaska, Guantanamo, and Porto Rico, is still scattered in little groups averaging not more than six hundred men each and without a possibility of getting together frequently for effective tactical training.

Take Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming, as an example. It cost about $5,000,000 to build Fort D. A. Russell. The soldiers stationed there are, for the most part, recruited in New York;

they are fed from the Mississippi Valley, clothed from New York, and when they are discharged, they are returned to New York at our expense. We think we are a mighty business-like nation. Yet a nice little padded coop would likely be recommended for any one of us who would build a costly factory at Steubenville, Ohio, and persist in a policy of frequently paying transportation to and from New York of laborers to run it on a plan that would mean maximum expense and minimum profit.

The reasons for the army-post waste are the same as they have been for twenty years: Army leaders grown old under the scattered post system; the tradition that a post commander to get favorable mention must maintain the "beautiful park" idea, with its extensive roads, walks, gardens, lawns, and independent and costly systems of lighting, water, and sewage; the argument that abandonment would mean throwing away immense sums already invested; and finally, the influence of affected communities, exerted through members of Congress and backed by pleas ranging from

FORT SHERIDAN, ILLINOIS: A NATIONAL EXTRAVAGANCE

"There are forty thousand Indians near this point" to "The people of this community are peaceful, law-abiding, hospitable and patriotic"; and the plaint of the legislator himself that "We would find it difficult to square ourselves with our constituency if our promises are not made good." The character and magnitude of the protest that goes up whenever an army post is threatened can be found by any one who will go through the records.

So, year after year, Congressmen and Senators have heard from home. They have played politics and we have our useless and wasteful posts.

There has been much muck-raking of members of Congress over army-post expenditures, much heated protest against log-rolling in the interest of individual communities. Yet the further one gets into the army-post records, the clearer it becomes that if muck-raking of Senators and Congressmen is to be undertaken it will be necessary to muck-rake a very large majority of both houses.

And right there is a great national weakness. They all do it.

Once in a while you come upon some one who did n't do it; and a few pages on you find that he did n't last long.

When the man whom we send to represent us in Congress is called upon to decide questions in connection with an inland waterway or a harbor, he puts the consideration of his local constituency first; when tariff questions arise and are to be legislated upon, he hears from back home and acts accordingly; when the abandonment of an obsolete, useless, and wasteful army post is advocated, he hears from the comparatively small local community affected, and fights it. He wants to stay in Congress and needs votes to keep him there.

It is n't his fault. It is our fault. Rather it is the fault of our system. So long as in casting our vote we place our home town, our home county, or our home State above the interest of the nation, and cling to the tradition that our executive officers have no business in the halls of Congress, we are not going to be justi-

fied in holding our representatives to account if they continue to throw away our money.

A candidate for the national legislature in a district where the vote is close cannot declare that he places the welfare of the nation above the interests of his district and win the place. We voters have proven it time and again. Kent, of California, to be sure, is one notable exception now in Congress. Politically he is a freak. He holds his place not by reason of but in spite of his patriotic utterances.

It would be a fine thing if we could bring ourselves to send to Congress men who would be free to exercise a real executive ability, free to consider the interest of the nation first.

The millennium is going to be a fine thing, too. Just now, human nature stands in the way of both. We can't change that by writing pieces for the paper. But we can, if we want, give our representatives in Congress a chance to hear the views of experts who have no local obligations and whose whole service is in the interest of the nation.

The proposition that our executives and our

legislators have no business to sit down and deliberate together has become almost a religion with us, since it was propounded by Montesquieu back in 1730. There is no place here for an argument as to whether this is as it should be. It is a fact, though, that this idea has been abandoned by Great Britain and by France and that it has no place in the Government of Switzerland.

By statute, or by the simpler process of resolution, we can, if we want, give the President the right to appear on the floor of either house and to say what he thinks should be said without exposing himself to gibes and the accusation that he is making a "grand-stand play." By the same process we can give the same opportunity to each member of the Cabinet.

If we want to, we can go even further than this. We can give the President the right to introduce bills; to prepare and introduce a budget containing estimates of the expenses of the Government for a coming year; and we can give Cabinet members the right to defend on the floor of either house the portions of

the President's budget involving their departments.

We could, of course, even go further, and prohibit the addition of items to the Executive budget without the concurrence of the President and Congress.

Whether we will want to do all this, or any part of it, or none of it, we cannot dodge the fact that we are wasting millions on our army.

To stop this waste and to secure maximum efficiency, military experts agree that the first step should be legislation that would concentrate the army in eight large posts of approximately equal size and located where transportation and supply would be most economic.

The following grouping of detachments of all arms is being advocated by our ablest military men: —

Two or three groups covering the Atlantic seaboard on the line between the St. Lawrence and Atlanta.

Two, possibly three, groups covering the Pacific seaboard, on the line between Puget Sound and Los Angeles.

Two groups between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande, which would serve as first reserve and which would supply central organizations around which could be built organizations of the National Guard, and, in time of war, volunteer forces in the interior of the continent.

It is estimated that by this means alone a total yearly saving of more than $5,500,000 would be accomplished. That very large sums are now invested in the scattered posts is true. The real estate occupied by these posts is valuable. It is the judgment, however, of men who have spent years on our military problems that it should be possible to refund this investment and largely to finance the redistribution of the army from moneys made available through the sale of government property which is no longer needed for military purposes. These men argue that there is no reason why the United States Government should not adopt the policy of the wise business man who tears down an antiquated building, representing a considerable original investment, in order to make room for

a much more economical and profitable structure.

There is becoming more and more evident a growing conviction that we should have something more than our regular army and our incomplete militia organizations. It is being asserted with increasing frequency that we should have a citizen force wholly adequate to protect the nation in any emergency, and that we can have such a force without giving ground an inch on our traditions and our institutions.

It is not so much that the application of our military theories has been all wrong, as stated in a previous paragraph, as it is that there has been scarcely any application at all.

It has been shown that in a time of desperate necessity we could, perhaps within six weeks, put into the field a force of not more than 150,000 men made up, for the most part, of regulars and groups of militia organized without uniformity, incompletely trained, short of artillery, and practically without the necessary auxiliary arms of the service. That pitifully small force would represent about all that we

have done toward applying the policy laid down in the days of the Revolution. We should have no officers for training new levies, and no means for organizing and handling the citizens who might enlist.

The time necessary for the training of volunteer forces depends upon whether or not there are trained instructors available. With trained officers at hand, and with the necessary supplies, implements, and equipment in reserve, bodies of raw recruits could probably be transformed into efficient fighting groups within six months.

But in a situation, such as we have to-day, where all officers available would be hardly sufficient for the regular army and the militia organization, and where the leaders and the men comprising volunteer forces would have to stumble toward efficiency through the desperate and costly school of experience in actual battle, months, even years, and thousands of lives needlessly wasted, would be the expenditure required to transform the inexperienced soldiers into efficient, defensive units.

Probably there was never a greater demonstration of this than during the Civil War. Between 1861 and 1865, two extemporized armies gradually developed while in conflict.

In 1861 both officers and men were unready for the tasks demanded of them. There was lack of cohesion between the units making up regiments and armies, and lack of coöperation between officers. At Bull Run, one force was disorganized by defeat, the other by victory, and it was not until 1863 that the armies could be regarded as complete and effective military organizations. Had one or the other of the armies been made up of men previously trained, it is the opinion of those who have given close study to that war that it would have been speedily ended.

The private cannot become a good private until his captain is a good captain. The captain cannot become a good captain until his colonel is a good colonel. And so it goes. Training of officers and men in actual conflict, without any preliminary training whatever, must be appallingly wasteful in both money and men.

Under present conditions of warfare, it is hardly to be imagined that any first-class nation would attack us by land with anything but trained forces. Yet we have devised no means of filling out our professional organization to large proportions in time of need.

The big hole in the pocket where we carry our army funds, of course, is the lack of any regular system of reserve. The professional soldier, the fighter who enters the army for a living, is the most expensive unit of defense a nation can have. The citizen soldier, who is called to the colors only in time of war, or for short periods of training, is the cheapest. A reasonable combination of the professional and the citizen soldier, in accordance with the established military policy of the United States, would give us, for our ninety millions, a defensive strength that would compare not unfavorably with that of any first-class nation.

CHAPTER V

OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS

One of the peculiarities of the effect here at home of the upheaval in Europe during the early months of the war was a rapidly developed belief in some quarters that matters pertaining to our own military fitness should not be discussed in polite society. We were warned time and again that to talk frankly among ourselves on this subject is an international indelicacy, and may not only shock some other higher up among the nations, but will also weaken our position as the world's great example of peace, purity, piety, and prosperity, when the day arrives when we shall venture to take those awful, barbarous foreign cut-throat nations by the hands, or hind legs, and lead them, or drag them, into ways of righteousness.

No doubt, those of us who have subscribed to this sort of propaganda, should we discover that that horrible, common brawl between

that low-down man and his wife next door all came about because the old man found a cockroach in his soup, would immediately throw all our own bug exterminators, our soup tureens, and ladles into the garbage can, for fear that their presence in our possession might interfere with our showing our quarreling neighbors how silly it is to start a fight over cockroaches and soup.

It used to be believed that to say "limb" when "leg" was meant kept boys and girls from being led into wickedness. As our notions have broadened, we have come more and more to call things by their right names. Right now, we are the spectators of a frightful war, between highly cultured peoples. To pull the long "better-than-thou" face of purity and piety is rank hypocrisy, and every Tom, Dick, and Harry of us knows it. There is no "limb" about it. It is plain "leg."

We are notorious in our national tendency to go up and down the world with a very discernible chip on our shoulder. We do not hesitate, or at least we have not hesitated in the past,

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MILITIA IN SHAM BATTLE

to meddle in the affairs of other nations, — of Russia, or China, or Japan, — and we get "sassy" as can be the instant there is the faintest suggestion that an outsider might, in the remotest possibility, resent our interference or tread on our pet political, commercial, or industrial corns.

We are a healthy and very courageous sort of folk, mighty willing to fight if we have to. Yet some of us insist, even when people are fighting to the death all around us, and it has been frightfully demonstrated that war can no longer be regarded only as a thing of the barbarous past, that it is harmful and indelicate to inquire what, if anything, we tote in our national hip pocket.

One of our blossoming statesmen, boaster of a greater stock of "clarion tones" than of information, is quoted as having dismissed the whole subject of our preparedness to defend ourselves in the following "ringing words": "Back of our splendid regular army is our militia; and back of our militia is the sturdy, glorious manhood of the nation."

The facts leave no room for doubt that somebody should have led the gentleman tenderly away and explained to him that the regular army really is not splendid; and that even if it were, the militia should not be back of it; and have advised him to read George Washington on the subject of the value of sturdy, untrained citizens in time of war.

In the opinion of every military expert who has made public his views on the subject from the time of Washington to the present, the militia should not be thought of as being back of the regular army, but one with the regular army. The fact that we have not carried out the fundamental principle of our military policy, that of bringing the professional and the citizen soldiery into uniformity of organization, equipment, and training, is one of our two great military weaknesses. The other one is our total lack of reserve strength, a subject which will be taken up further on. The lack of uniformity between the militia and the regular army can be charged almost entirely to a failure to build up an efficient coöperation be-

tween the individual States and the Federal Government. No doubt this failure is due entirely to thoughtlessness and an incomplete realization of the peril that lies in this slipshod method of applying the principles of our military theories.

Washington sounded a warning against just such a condition at the close of the Revolution. Back of what he said were years of bitter experience. In taking leave of the Governors of the States before resigning his commission, writing with the experience of a soldier and with the foresight of the real statesman, he said this: —

> There are four things, which I humbly conceive, are essential to the well-being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States, as an independent power.
>
> First. An indissoluble union of the States under one federal head;
>
> Second. A sacred regard to public justice;
>
> Third. The adoption of a proper peace establishment; and
>
> Fourth. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the United

States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity; and in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community. . . .

It is necessary to say but a few words on the third topic which was proposed, and which regards particularly the defense of the Republic; as there can be little doubt that Congress will recommend a proper peace establishment for the United States, in which a due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing. If this should be the case, I would beg leave to urge the great advantage of it in the strongest terms. The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accouterments, and military apparatus should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed.

Notwithstanding Washington's warning and similar ones by military men ever since his time, although the machinery for securing uniformity in the organization of our military forces has been provided, the militia organizations, except in rare instances, are designed primarily for the immediate needs of the individual States, and very little thought is given to bringing them to a point where they would be really efficient if called upon to act in the defense of the nation.

Twelve years have elapsed since the passage of the militia law, and in some instances the important provisions of that law, especially relating to raising the standard of efficiency and to providing well-rounded organization, are not nearer to being complied with to-day than they were when the law was passed. The act requiring conformity in organization between the regular army and the militia was passed in 1903 and permitted five years for the carrying-out of its provisions. At the end of that time the period was further extended to January 21, 1910.

In his report for the year 1913, General A. L. Mills, Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, discussing this point said this: —

Properly balanced divisions are so vital to the successful use of troops, that until the present deficiency in auxiliary arms is removed it constitutes a grave peril. This fact cannot be realized by the organized militia itself at present, or an insistent demand from that body would result. There is but one obstacle that at present stands in the way of obtaining the desired result, and that is the indifference of the organized militia itself to the subject. Since the members of this body are engaged during the day in making a living, and devote only a certain number of evenings a week to the military profession, and since there is so much ground for them to cover in performing their routine military duties, naturally the work immediately in hand fully occupies their available time, and large questions, such as the one now under consideration, are in general left in each State to the organized militia officer who is practically continuously engaged in military work. I refer to the adjutant-general. This man in most States devotes his entire time to the organized militia; he is the governor's military adviser and he largely shapes military legislation in the State. It may be said, therefore, that in a great measure the safety of the United States de-

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pends upon having balanced divisions and that the securing of these balanced divisions depends upon the forty-eight adjutants-general. This is a fact seldom realized. There is no doubt in my mind that were these gentlemen to fully appreciate the great responsibility that is upon them, and were they to lay the situation before the members of the organized militia in their respective States, frankly and earnestly, entering in a whole-souled way into the work, the present difficulties would disappear, and in a short time we should emerge from the serious danger that now threatens us.

The peace establishment which Washington urged, we have secured, and having secured it and brought it to a state where it is moderately well equipped and thoroughly well trained, through sheer thoughtlessness we have been unfair enough to place upon it the greater portion of the military responsibility of the nation.

The regular army is the national military hired man. At present among its most important duties are: —

To supply peace garrisons for foreign possessions of the United States;

To supply peace garrisons for fortified harbors, and naval bases;

To prevent naval raids which under modern methods of warfare may precede a declaration of war, and which may determine the initiative by giving the enemy a convenient base for invading operations;

To supply a mobile reserve prepared to reinforce foreign garrisons in case of insurrection and disorder;

To furnish forces sufficient for the occupation of foreign territory where treaty rights or established national policies are threatened;

To be able to coöperate with the navy in the formation of joint expeditions to protect the foreign interests of the United States and its citizens;

To be ready to mobilize on instant notice and to strike quickly and successfully at the outbreak of war, before an army of citizen soldiers can be concentrated;

To maintain itself as an experimental model for the volunteer army, to demonstrate the application of military practices, and to serve as a means of educating and training and organizing citizen forces. It must be a school of mili-

tary theory and practice, not only for the development of soldiers, but for the development of officers who will be capable of assuming important duties in war;

To unify a military doctrine and policy which must permeate the entire national army if it is to succeed in war;

To prepare an advance for equipment, transportation, and supply of a great citizen army in time of war;

To act for the peace and safety of any community within the borders which may require its services.

It may be that it is high time for us to decide whether it is safe, so far as we ourselves are concerned, and whether it is fair to our military hired man, to place upon him, in addition to keeping our home in order, and taking his part in preventing our neighbors from becoming too presuming, practically the whole responsibility of defending the home against other fighting men, perhaps twenty or thirty times his size. If we decide that there is peril as well as injustice in our present handling of

our military resources, the way out is most simple: —

First: By legislation we can remedy the defects in the nucleus about which we can build an adequate defensive strength.

Next: We can coördinate the militia and the professional organization.

Finally: We can utilize our tremendous but undeveloped military resources in men and material.

The means by which the regular army organization may be perfected have been described in a previous chapter.

What should we do with the militia?

If it is to form a part of a peace army which in time of war is to be efficient, what must be required of it?

The infantry makes up the bulk of an army. Infantry is made up of men whose means of transportation is their own feet, and who carry with them their own weapons, ammunition, shelter, and food. On the march or in battle, the infantry bears the heaviest burdens, and

sustains the heaviest losses. Military genius in our country organizes the infantry into brigades of three regiments each, commanded by a brigadier-general. Three battalions make up each regiment. The regiment is commanded by a colonel. Each battalion consists of four companies, each commanded by a captain and two lieutenants. In each regiment there is a band, a machine-gun platoon with two automatic guns, and a few mounted scouts.

The fighting arm of first importance associated with the infantry is the field artillery. The largest field artillery unit which we have is the regiment, commanded by a colonel. The regiment consists of two battalions. The battalion is made up of three batteries of four guns, each in command of a captain and four lieutenants. The artillery is of various kinds, according to the work for which it is designed. We have horse artillery, which may accompany the cavalry, for example, and mounted artillery with guns of a type that may be dismounted and carried on pack mules. Next to the field artillery in importance as a fighting

arm comes the cavalry. In the cavalry the three subdivisions of the regiment are known as squadrons and instead of companies there are troops. As other auxiliary arms are the engineers, the signal corps, the medical department, including ambulance companies and field hospitals, and the quartermaster corps for the furnishing of transportation, rations, and shelter, and which has charge of the payment of troops.

The branch of the army not included in the mobile forces is the coast artillery intended for operating the great guns which command the entrances to important harbors.

The smallest military unit which contains all arms of the service, and all branches of the staff is the division. The division, therefore, is the smallest unit capable of independent action. A complete infantry division should comprise: —

Headquarters, 27 men; three brigades of infantry, 17,244 men; one regiment of cavalry, 1308 men; one brigade of light artillery, 2391 men; one pioneer battalion of engineers, 514

men; one field battalion of signal troops, 176 men; commander of trains, military police, etc., 15 men; one ammunition train, 216 men; one supply train, 194 men; one sanitary train, 570 men; one engineer train, 10 men. The aggregate, 22,665 men, is made up as follows: Combatant officers, 620; medical officers, 94; chaplains, 12; combatant enlisted men, 20,673; enlisted men, hospital corps, 826; enlisted men, quartermaster corps, 421; civilians, 9; veterinarians, 10.

These figures are based on long experience of all the nations of the world, and although the units in the armies of different nations vary in size, and are called by different names, the proportions approximate very closely.

A study of the experience of nations in modern warfare, in an examination of the conditions of our militia, led the Army War College and the Divisions of Military Affairs very recently to establish twelve divisions of organized militia. This was a step in advance. But an examination of the condition of the militia shows a great variation in the proportions of

the various arms of the service. No two are alike, and not one is wholly complete. With the exception of the sixth division (New York), where rapid progress is being made, there is not a complete division of militia within sight. The militia divisions have been established as follows: —

Fifth Division — Headquarters, Boston; Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut.

Sixth Division — Headquarters, Albany; New York.

Seventh Division — Headquarters, Harrisburg; Pennsylvania.

Eighth Division — Headquarters, Washington; New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia.

Ninth Division — Headquarters, Atlanta; North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida.

Tenth Division — Headquarters, Nashville; Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi.

Eleventh Division — Headquarters, Columbus; Ohio, Michigan.

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Twelfth Division — Headquarters, Chicago; Illinois, Indiana.

Thirteenth Division — Headquarters, St. Paul; Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota.

Fourteenth Division — Headquarters, Kansas City; Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado.

Fifteenth Division — Headquarters, San Antonio; New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, Arizona.

Sixteenth Division — Headquarters, San Francisco; California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Nevada.

In each one of these divisions, with the possible exception of the sixth and fifteenth, there is an excess of infantry and a deficiency in the arms upon which infantry depends for maintenance and operation in war. Recent figures show that the various divisions fall short of what efficiency would demand in action approximately as follows: —

Divisions	Field artillery batteries	Cavalry troops	Engineer companies	Signal companies	Field hospitals	Ambulance companies	Ammunition militia trains	Supply trains	Pack trains
5	6	3	3	–	1	2	1	1	1
6	–	3	–	–	2	1	1	1	1
7	10	4	1	1	4	4	1	1	1
8	9	9	3	1	2	4	1	1	1
9	10	6	3	2	3	3	1	1	1
10	10	12	3	1	1	3	1	1	1
11	7	6	–	–	1	–	1	1	1
12	6	3	2	–	2	3	1	1	1
13	8	11	3	2	3	4	1	1	1
14	7	8	2	–	2	3	1	1	1
15	7	5	2	1	3	4	1	1	1
16	7	7	3	–	2	2	1	1	1
Total	87	77	25	8	26	33	12	12	12

This condition, to some extent, at least, is due to misinterpretation by the organized militia itself of the terms of our militia law. Under the amended Militia Act, the President has the power to fix the minimum strength of enlisted men in each company, battery, troop, etc. Misunderstanding, or misinterpretation, or both, seems to have centered around the meaning of the term "minimum number." The original intention was that the minimum strength of any unit should be sufficient to provide men in large enough numbers to be trained as a unit, and a sufficient number of

units to make possible a nucleus so organized as to be capable of expansion to adequate war strength without losing in efficiency.

In other words, the intention of the act was to supply enough men to make possible the application of the general theory of the national defense, so far as concerned the militia. During the years following the passage of the act, however, its terms have been interpreted, apparently, to mean that the minimum number is the smallest strength that units must have in order to be taken into the Federal service. There has come about, therefore, the existence of units so absurdly small as to make it impossible to carry out what our military men had in mind in their efforts to fix a standard of minimum strength. The latest complete figures available show that out of approximately 1600 companies of infantry, 1030 are below minimum strength. The average strength of the field artillery is about two thirds of what the law requires. In no other arm of the service is the average up to the required standard.

In recent years, very definite efforts have been made to standardize the system of training for the organized militia, but the shortage of officers in the regular army has made it impossible to supply anywhere near the number necessary for instructing and training of troops outside the regular organization. Lack of facilities for both indoor and outdoor training has also been a serious obstacle.

As a result, recruits are admitted to militia organizations as trained soldiers fit for duty in the regular army who have had no actual field experience and the most casual indoor military training. Among my acquaintances is a man who has been admitted in this manner into what is known as a crack regiment of militia. He has had eight periods of marching in an armory, during which time, to use his own words, he has learned "which end of the gun the bullet comes out of, and what is the difference between 'right' and 'left dress.'"

The militiaman each year receives twenty-four hour-and-a-half drills in the armory and a period of training in the field — if the legis-

MILITIA OFFICERS IN CONSULTATION DURING FIELD PRACTICE

lature of his State does not refuse to appropriate the necessary money for the field practice.

Statistics recently collected show that of a total of 1971 militia organizations reported on, 480 had drill halls not adequate for indoor instruction; 162 had armories used for other than military purposes, which interfered with military training; 188 which did not afford the United States property the proper protection; 470 which were not equipped with means of indoor rifle practice; 182 which had neither equipment nor room for indoor gallery practice; and 628 whose location, construction, and equipment were not such as to encourage enlistment or reënlistment.

It can be shown that one fourth of our organized militia cannot be properly instructed in drill, and cannot receive the necessary instruction in target practice.

Not only is the organized militia deficient in the necessities for proper training, but it is not adequately supplied with uniforms and equipment, either in quantity or in kind, sufficient for its needs, should all, or a large part

of it, be called into the service of the United States. A very noticeable tendency is shown in many States to provide only the supplies needed by the troops for the short period of the annual field exercises. Many States equip their troops, apparently, for state purposes only. Yet the Federal Government spends about $4,000,000 a year to help bring the militia to reasonable efficiency as a war organization. The militia's deficiency in the most important auxiliary arms of the service, field artillery and cavalry, is due to the fact that these arms are the most expensive to maintain, and least likely to be found necessary in handling local situations. Federal expenditures have not yet given States generally a broader view of the functions of their militia organizations nor secured means of rapid, orderly, and effective mobilization.

The condition that carries with it the greatest peril is the total lack of any means of filling out the militia organizations, already containing many untrained men, with men who have had even preliminary military instruction.

There is a vast difference between paper strength and actual military strength. On paper, the strength of our organized militia is 8323 officers, and 119,087 men, or approximately 127,300 men and officers.

The actual strength of the militia, officers and men, can be placed at approximately 64,000 men and officers, but it is not conceivable that even this number could be assembled in a time of urgent need, and it is a fact that almost every organization contains a considerable number of men who have not received sufficient or proper training to fit them to be capable soldiers. In time of sudden war, what is now believed to be the actual strength of our militia would undoubtedly be reduced by the inability, physical or otherwise, of members of the organizations to serve with the colors.

What is to be done about it?

The adjutant-generals and other military officers of our States, the military men in our regular army, and many of our leading statesmen have given the closest study to the prob-

lem, and they are approaching the general agreement approximating the following: —

That in time of peace, each State should be considered as a territorial militia department with the Governor the commander-in-chief of the department;

That officers on the staff of the Governor, not members of the line or of the staff corps of the organized militia, should not be considered as part of the organization under the law;

That there should be sufficient officers and administrative corps to carry on proper military administration in time of peace, and to provide sufficient officers for the state organization both in time of peace and war;

That the organization of the militia should be made to conform with the divisional organization of the regular army;

That if the number of companies in a complete militia regiment falls, at any time, below twelve, exclusive of the machine-gun company, the deficiency should be replaced within six months, or the regiment considered as permanently abandoned, its members either being

assigned to other organizations or mustered out.

We opened this chapter by subscribing to the contention that it is worth while to call things by their right names. There is no disputing the fact that, with few exceptions, the state organizations of our militia are poorly filled, indifferently trained, partially, and in some cases wholly, lacking in personnel and equipment necessary to a well-balanced fighting force which can be counted upon to give a satisfactory account of itself in battle.

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT

An army across the Connecticut River, driving our handful of defenders northward, was as far as the speculation was carried in our imaginary attack on New York.

Suppose it is carried a bit further.

Suppose the following as fragmentary press accounts of a struggle at the Connecticut to check a hostile advance on New York: —

With the Army, March 28 — Although the presence of small advance detachments of the enemy was reported by our scouts toward evening, apparently the main body of the enemy's forces had not yet come up, and, owing to our lack of aeroplanes for scouting, it was decided to throw a squadron of cavalry across the river.

It was only when the troops were pouring across in fancied security that two batteries of the enemy's guns, cleverly posted and screened,

opened their concentrated fire on the crowded bridge.

Before the blast of shrapnel and machine-gun projectiles, scores of our men were swept into the river. The challenge of the enemy's guns was taken up by our artillery, and a spirited duel continued for an hour, under cover of which our cavalry retreated and reformed. The enemy's batteries finally became silent, but on account of our lack of aeroplanes it was impossible to determine whether the hostile guns had been put out of action by our fire or had changed their position. Because of an appalling shortage, orders have been issued to save every possible round of ammunition.

In the trenches, March 29 — Before dawn it became apparent that the enemy was to attempt the crossing. Several night advances by small detachments were made. But our scouts were alert and our guns had the range. During the night, apparently, the enemy brought up additional and heavier artillery.

These guns were set to work at an early hour this morning, when the prospect began to

change. Several of our batteries were soon moved backward. Though suffering heavy loss, at last the enemy managed to get a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery across the river and into position. Under the protection of a heavy bombardment of our position, two more batteries were got over and were planted at the bridge-head. With three hostile batteries and a brigade of infantry over the water, a retirement to our secondary entrenched position was ordered.

Hardly had the movement been completed when the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's field artillery became apparent. A terrific fire was poured into our lines from a distance fully four miles away. Our lighter artillery was powerless against the heavy guns.

The enemy is now centering his rain of steel upon our entrenchments. For three hours our brave young fellows have stood the terrific ordeal, unable to fire a shot in return. Any man raising his head above the fire-swept earth ramparts is certain of death. Lying flat on their bellies, all our men can do is to pray for a

respite and a chance to charge the ever-increasing forces on our side of the river and to silence their guns. The enemy for the most part is using shrapnel. Hastily entrenched as we are, our forces are suffering terribly.

Hostile aeroplanes, like great hawks, are soaring continually over our lines. It is impossible to conceal our batteries, no matter how frequently they are moved. Our inferiority in aircraft and the impossibility of locating hostile batteries is maddening. While the hostile gunners find the range quickly and exactly, we waste round after round of precious ammunition in attempting to search out the enemy's positions.

Ignoring our guns, the hostile artillerymen, relying on concealment for immunity, are concentrating all their efforts to enfilade our trenches. With an apparent prodigality of ammunition they continue to pour bouquet after bouquet of high explosives or combined shrapnel and high explosive shells into our works.

With the Army, March 29 — Toward mid-

afternoon our artillery fire noticeably slackened. The enemy continued to pour a withering fire of ever-increasing volume and intensity over our trenches. The enemy's plan was to keep our artillery busy and to hold our forces in the trenches while the crossing of the river was accomplished. On our side of the river, the artillery was thrown well forward in screened positions. Only once during the soul-racking day was there a charge. It came during a lull in the artillery duel when a regiment of militia, lying in advanced trenches, cut to pieces under the merciless hail from a battery of quick-firers, cracked under the strain and sprang into the open. Careless of the quick-firers masked behind the enemy's advance posts, they charged with the bayonet. A stream of lead was poured into them before they had covered half the distance to the river. Only a handful regained the trenches. It was here that the enemy showed immense superiority in mitrailleuses, which gave them marvelous mobility and a very deadly advantage. These quick-firers were masked with great skill, and were worked with

the very apparent object of drawing an infantry attack. It was with the greatest difficulty that our officers were able to prevent impetuous and disastrous advances from our trenches.

Your correspondent has talked to a wounded lieutenant brought to the rear at the beginning of the engagement.

"We are helpless against those guns across the river," he said. "It was heartbreaking to see the boys dropping from the shrapnel, without a chance to get back at the beggars. It made me sick, even in the excitement of it all. The enemy's quick-firers were marvelous. I am bound to say they had it pretty much their own way. If we only had aeroplanes to match theirs! They are constantly sailing over our positions. Then it always happens the same way. Those aeroplanes are really wonderful in the way they search out the positions of our guns. We always know that within half an hour of observation by aeroplane, shells will begin to fall above gunners, unless they have altered their position.

"The shell fire is terrifying. I confess to you

that there were times when my nerves were absolutely gone. One hears the *zip-zip* of bullets, the *boom* of the large guns, the *ste-tang* of the lighter artillery; and in all this infernal experience of noise and stench, the screams, at times, of dying horses and men joined with the fury of gun-fire and rising shrill above it, no man may boast of his courage. There were moments when I was a coward with all of them. It cannot last much longer. We must either attack or fall back."

The first day of fighting proves conclusively that the enemy intends making it a battle of guns against men. If our lines are forced to retire, it is clearly the enemy's intention to advance to our position with as little loss of men as possible. It is evident that the hostile forces are supplied with abundant ammunition for an extended campaign. Our men have not enough at hand for another day's action.

With the Army, March 29 (midnight) — Our forces are retreating toward the North, fighting a stubborn rear-guard action. They have failed to hold the invaders at the Connecticut.

THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT

Washington, March 30 — A War Department statement, admitting defeat at the Connecticut River and the hopelessness of further attempting to defend New York, contains the following report concerning yesterday's fighting: —

"By nightfall it became apparent that if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted, and an order was given to commence it at 8.30 o'clock. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which has suffered heavily, and the fine work of the cavalry assisted materially in a most difficult and dangerous operation.

"Our initial force has been cut off from retreat toward New York, and its only avenue is north. It must join with the New England militia before there will be hope of successfully making another stand."

Now the only speculation in all of the foregoing is in its application. The description of the fighting is taken, almost word for word,

from official and well-authenticated news accounts of the struggle in Europe in the battle of the Marne, practically the only alteration being the substitution of the words "American," "our," or "enemy," for "German," "English," "French," or "Allies."

It is admitted, of course, that portions of actual narration, which particularly dealt with incidents where there was a marked superiority of artillery strength on one side or the other, have been selected.

Is such a selection and such an application warranted in a discussion of our military strength, — a discussion based on a premise that a first-class nation would consider it possible and profitable to attack us by land?

A part of the answer is in history; a part of it is in what is going on in Europe every day; a part of it is in the facts of our own power of defense.

"Battles are won by superiority of fire."

When a military expert takes a long breath, pauses for complete silence and for concentrated attention, and divulges this one great

secret of success in armed strife on sea or land, there is not one of us in ten thousand, probably, who is inclined to rear up and dispute him.

Even the man who has never laid finger to trigger has a sneaking notion that since battles hang on the ability to kill or maim, and since killing in war, for the most part, is done by the burning of powder in various quantities and various ways, the side who can set off its powder to the greatest advantage is the side that is going to win.

Eye, reach, and hitting power may be set down as a fairly accurate dynamic analysis of this matter of superiority of fire. "Volume, accuracy, and range of fire" is another and more technical way of putting it.

Strategy, bayonet action, cavalry charges, all the tricks, deceptions, and heroic incidents of a campaign, go into this matter of burning powder. For it is true, of course, that all battles are not won by *actual* superiority of fire. Many of them are won by the *power* of one side or another to *exert*, instantly, at some point in

the struggle, an overwhelming superiority of fire.

Something like forty-five years ago, a German fighting force captured the French Emperor, Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon, and all of the French regular army except what had been bottled up at Metz, and other forts on the frontier.

All this happened by reason of the fact that the Germans had worked themselves into a position where they could, if they wanted to, pour a fire into the French ranks that would mean slaughter and practical annihilation. In securing this advantage, the artillery had been the most powerful factor. The German artillery had been rushed to the front, supported by a very small escort of cavalry and infantry, and by being at the right place at the right time had been able to exert a fire which drove the French back in their efforts to escape to the East. Rapidly other German forces pressed in. German batteries secured hills bordering the valley of the Meuse in sufficient strength to repulse every attempt of the French

PRUSSIAN CITIZEN SOLDIERY OF 1870
From a Painting by Edouard Detaille

army to break through. The long-range shelling of the forces massed in Sedan was so murderous in its effect that to escape the slaughter the French were forced to an unconditional surrender.

It was in 1870 that the tremendous importance of the field gun in modern warfare began to be demonstrated. Up to that time artillery had been looked upon as an awkward and cumbersome weapon. It had been the custom to place the artillery well in the rear of marching columns and to protect it with large bodies of infantry and cavalry. This whole theory was upset by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. They risked surprise and capture of artillery for the advantage of exerting a powerful artillery fire before the enemy could bring his field guns from the rear to the front.

In the present struggle in Europe, in every individual battle, the artillery is in action from the very start, and the advantage to one side or the other is almost always determined by the outcome of preliminary artillery duels.

The musket has not gone out. The rifle is

simply a refined musket. It has its part; but in modern warfare the man with the rifle comes in only after the field gun has done its work, or when the field gun is doing its work effectively — at least, as well as the field gun of the other fellow.

The rifle and the bayonet are the deciding factors in many a sharp struggle in Europe, but, in the official accounts, before the infantry attack, we almost invariably read of the artillery duel.

The charge may come at a period when the duel is a draw, when a change of position is in progress, or when the batteries of one side have established a superiority.

At other times the man with the gun lies in the shelter of the trench facing death with every shrapnel shell that screeches its way from the enemy's lines, waiting, day by day, sometimes praying, for action that will break the terrific monotony.

One of the most interesting, illuminating, and pathetic documents touching this phase of modern warfare is contained in the letters of

Norman Leslie, a captain of the British Rifle Brigade, who was killed in action near Lille, on October 18, 1914. Only a few days before the action in which he lost his life, Captain Leslie wrote this to a member of his family: —

September 23 — I write this in the midst of a furious battle, but as our part is to sit still in our trenches for the time, I am enabled to do so. Our artillery are about seven or eight thousand yards from German main position. Night before last we marched, crossed a certain river and climbed up to the heights on the other side, where we relieved a certain regt. They had been in these trenches for seven days and had lost Heaven knows what; the 2 co'ys whose lines I relieved having alone 120 casualties, i.e., 25 per cent! Well, we got the business of relieving them done by about 2 A.M., and the minute dawn broke their snipers (German) started at us. It was light about 5 A.M., and we had a little time to look around and examine our position. The trenches are at the top of a line of hills with the valley and river in rear of us; they are most irregular, and just consist of little zig-zag lines on the highest part of the sky line. The German main position is only 1200 yards off, and very powerful; they have got earth trenches and infantry about 300 yards from us.

I've now got to 7 A.M. yesterday, the 22nd. About

7.30 hell broke loose above us and shrapnel fairly tore around us; we lay low in our trenches with only one sentry looking out for their infantry. I've got about 120 men under me in a series of hollow ventrants, so I can only see the 50 men in my particular hollow, but I walk round on a path just below these little hillocks which connects them all.

About 8.30 a man ran from A round to me and said he'd got about 7 men badly hit in their trenches, so I dashed round with him and found a proper charnel house — all shrapnel wounds, one arm hanging by a shred, another pierced through the lungs, another neck, back and thigh, 2 broken legs. . . . I got a corporal and we pulled them out and down to the path where we had got another little pit dug. It was d——d ticklish work. I was trying to tie up one fellow's leg when crash came another shrapnel and wiped out another man 20 yards off. At the end of the job I was drenched with their blood, the unpleasant part being that we have no water to drink at present, far less to wash with. I returned to my little pit and, working hard, made it moderately bomb-proof by about 1.00. About 2.00 the German artillery died down and we were n't worried again till the evening — their snipers don't worry us at all. The cruel thing for the wounded was that they had to lie there all yesterday; we had not doctor or stretcher bearers, and even if they had been there they could n't have

gone down, as it's fair death moving from the trenches to the river by day. About 7 P.M. it got dark and we sent them off, but one was dead, and the lung fellow died on the way down.

Well, I've got to about 9 P.M. yesterday, and I retired after my bully dinner to my crevice in the ground and was instantly woke by star shell, 2 of which pitched 10 and 15 yards away; and they were of course followed by a roar of rifle fire and artillery as well. You know what they do: they look like a rocket, and bursting diffuse a pale light around them — quite harmless in themselves, but excellent in lighting up our position to the German fire.

They started up again with their old shrapnel about 9 A.M. — it's pretty to watch. First comes a Taube aeroplane miles high above us, circles round and drops out sort of smoky balls just over us to give his gunner friends the range — then about five minutes afterwards, bang come the shells. However, we suffered but little this morning, as our gunners came up about a mile behind us and helped by one of our aeroplanes fairly bombarded the German batteries. We've sat here quite comfortably all day between the rival batteries watching the shells burst on both sides. The aeroplanes cross continually, but don't molest each other, and, of course, fire clean out of range of our infantry fire. They certainly are the masters of the situation,

these fliers — though they do no damage themselves, yet they give all information and are apparently quite immune themselves. It is a curious position being between the rival batteries. We hear them sizzling straight over us all the time.

The shrapnel bursting emit white smoke, and the high explosives a black smoke. The Germans have got two of their big batteries working over us. They don't cause nearly as much loss of life as shrapnel, unless they hit a column of men or house. But anything hit is blown to bits. Very little remains of a house, far less of a man. Well, I must stop now and try and sleep a little before the night bombardment. The coming of day is a real joy to us. Night is bloody and we fear an attack the whole time. The general plan —which I'm allowed to state by the Censor as it's already in your papers, and this letter won't reach you for ages — is that we sit tight till the French outflank them, then a general advance till we bump up into another of these positions.

October 6 — Herewith a typical night. 5:45 P.M. All stand to arms during the dusk till night has fallen, the Germans being rather fond of attacking at that hour. (Attack on the guards, etc.)

The men sleep in the trenches with double sentry posts every 15 yards or so. I lie in the open just behind them ready to go to any part of my line that gets engaged. About 8.00 I rise with a start,

and see a star rocket coming from the German trench, and pitching right beside me — during its flight it illumines everything round it with a pale yellow light — every one instinctively holds their breath, and those standing up lie down, for that which follows comes quickly! A rattle of musketry and machine guns! I get up and walk round the sentries, then lie down again — suddenly crash comes the German shrapnel and for about 5 minutes the peaceful night resounds with shell fire. Silence again, and I try and sleep for a few minutes — then a watery gurgling sound over my head, for all the world like the lap of water against a boat, and it's our own shells passing over our heads to burst on the German trenches or artillery. This continues on and off throughout the night, relieved occasionally by the swish of a sentry's bullet either from our or their trench.

How far does all this touch America and our chance of successfully resisting a land attack?

CHAPTER VII

HELL ON WHEELS

Two great elements go into the matter of "superiority of fire," or, if you like, of "eye, reach, and hitting power."

One is the element that goes off. The other is the element that sets it off. Guns in war are of no use without men. The obverse is no less a fact. It must be remembered that the rifle is a gun just as much, though not just as big, as the heavy howitzer.

We speak of our "war" strength and our "peace" strength. Our peace strength is made up of the men we maintain under arms. Our war strength includes these, and, in addition, the men who would be under arms if war should come our way. While on paper the peace strength of our regular army is about 90,000 men and officers of all arms, and of our organized militia 127,000 men and officers of variegated arms, — mostly infantry, — the strength

of both organizations combined, the force which we could instantly throw into battle line on the Atlantic Coast is about 50,000 men, while the mobile force we could assemble within our borders within thirty days is about 90,000 men. That is about our peace strength, and it may be said that it is our actual immediate war strength.

Within six weeks, of course, we might possibly increase our force with men who have had some military training, to something near 150,000 men. That may be considered as our semi-war strength.

Experts, including the chief men of our General Staff and several of our Secretaries of War, have estimated that for a successful defense of our continental territory against hostile aggression by any first-class nation of the world, we should have ready at the outbreak of the war a well-balanced force of not less than 500,000 men, with at least 300,000 more to be raised at once. We should without the shadow of a doubt get them — ultimately — even if war should come to-night. Yet if history teaches

anything, we should get most of them by conscription. They would be poorly trained, if trained at all. The greater the time required to collect them, the more we should have to collect. Untrained men desert faster, are captured oftener, and are killed off more rapidly than trained men. But we should get them. Sooner or later we should have the men.

Men, millions of them, are already manufactured. Iron and copper, millions of tons of it, are in the ground. In war, the men, ultimately, would be trained to shoot; minerals, ultimately, would be converted into things to shoot with. But the cost in life, money, and time, during the process of converting military resources into military strength during actual warfare, has always been, and must always be, frightful. Our actual immediate strength in the one great element, men, is shown elsewhere in these pages.

If we should find it necessary to put half a million men in the field, and if, through necessity, we should find the way to do it, how should we arm them?

Rifles? Probably. We have finished, or nearly finished, about 700,000 rifles, with something over 200,000,000 rounds of ammunition. Counting out coast artillery, an army of 500,000 men would have about 420,000 infantry and cavalry. Our field service regulations, based on the experience of all nations in war, call for 1340 rounds of ammunition behind each rifle and 1080 rounds behind each saber. If 1200 rounds be taken as a safe average, we should need a small-arms ammunition supply of about 504,000,000 rounds; and if we were to have an adequate supply for the rifles we have finished or nearly finished, as against the 200,000,000 rounds we now have, we should have about 840,000,000 rounds. It is to be remembered, however, that small-arms ammunition can be manufactured quickly and in large quantities. It is not in this shortage that the greatest danger lies.

Should we be forced into a war prepared as we are to-day, after we should have herded our men, put rifles in their hands, buckled cartridge belts around them, and sent them into

battle, thousands of them, without question, would be slaughtered before they could discharge an effective bullet from their rifles.

The reason for this would be our weakness in the matter of the field gun.

There are two weapons which modern warfare has developed for use in fire action. These are the magazine rifle and the field gun. The rifle is considered to be most effective at 800 yards, although the modern weapon can be used effectively at a range of 1200 yards, and even beyond that. For rifle fire to become a factor, and an important factor, in modern warfare, therefore, the infantry must be thrown very close to the enemy's line. Now, the range of the modern field gun is measured in miles, and in every battle of recent times the infantry has gone into the zone of artillery fire long before reaching the range where any purpose would be served through the use of the rifle. The field artillery is designed not only to cover an infantry advance, but to support an infantry attack throughout an action. The artillery may be directed toward an enemy's

own field batteries in order to create confusion, to suppress or neutralize opposing artillery fire, to force frequent changes in the location of hostile batteries, or it may be used directly on the infantry of the opposing force. No matter where it is turned, its purpose is to shatter an attack or to support one. When under cover of supporting field guns, infantry forces gain ground, that ground can only be held by the maintained activity of the field guns.

Through the variety of the work which it has been called upon to do, field artillery has practically classified itself. Common to modern warfare, there are now batteries used for supporting infantry advances; batteries used to neutralize an enemy's field artillery fire; batteries whose function is to break down obstacles, earth-works or men, which may be in the way of advancing infantry. The accounts of engagements in all our modern wars show with steadily increasing clearness how absolutely indispensable in successful military operations is the field gun and back of it the trained artilleryman.

ARE WE READY?

Only as this is being written, a copy of a New York evening paper has been laid on my desk. The following are the headlines and the first few paragraphs of its daily story of the War in Europe: —

KAISER BEATEN IN BATTLES TO EXTEND HOLD NORTH OF AISNE

FRENCH TWICE DEFEAT ATTACKS

German Charges near Vic, Twelve Miles west of Soissons broken up by Fire of Field Batteries

Hill in Argonne valiantly defended against Invaders

Teuton Artillery outmatched in Long-Range Engagement at Perthes — Le Prêtre Forest cleared of Enemy

Paris, Monday — Germany's aggressive maneuvers in the Soissons-Aisne district appear to have been completely halted by the splendidly conducted defense of the French, not only on the south bank of the Aisne, but westward of Soissons, where the French maintain a strong hold on the north side of the stream.

Deterred from attacking east of Soissons by the fire of French field batteries, the Germans have attempted twice to break down the defensive of the French at a point northeast of Vic-sur-Aisne

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THE TERROR OF THE GERMANS

The Famous French Artillery in Action

and about twelve miles north of Soissons. Both these attacks were defeated by the French, who maintained their positions intact.

Near Perthes-les-Hurlus, between Rheims and the Argonne, the French artillery has overcome that of the Germans in a violent duel.

French artillery forces defending "Hill 263," near Bourseuilles, in the Argonne district, have repulsed a determined attack by the Germans and have held all their trenches.

The Kaiser's troops have been driven from several field forts in the foothills of the Vosges Mountains, notably in the Forest of Le Prêtre.

From the sea to the Oise there was yesterday a violent storm, particularly in Belgium. The day saw artillery fighting at certain points.

In the region of Perthes there was very efficient marksmanship on the part of our artillery on the positions of the enemy.

The Chief of our Ordnance Department recently estimated that to build enough field guns for an army of 70,000 would require at least a year.

Are we ready? How would we match up with any possible foe in this single matter of "hell on wheels," — the modern field gun?

Suppose it should transpire that we were

confronted suddenly with just such a problem as the situation we have imagined to exist at the Connecticut River. Suppose that instead of this handful of 50,000 men, we should be able to throw forward as a battle line a force of 500,000 men; and suppose that the enemy, instead of outnumbering us, should be only equal to our own force numerically, but should be equipped with field guns and ammunition in accordance with the most advanced theories and practice of modern warfare, — what then would be our chance of immediate success?

Our General Staff has set the proportion of field guns which we should have at 3.16 guns for every thousand infantry and cavalry. That is a lower proportion than exists in actual operation in the army of any other first-class nation in the world. There are instances where European armies average five guns for every thousand infantry and cavalry. The present war in Europe indicates that the percentage in the future will be much higher.

Our General Staff has classified field artillery as follows: —

"Horse," "light," "mountain," and "heavy."

Horse batteries are armed with the 3-inch gun.

Light batteries are armed with the 3-inch gun or the 3.8-inch howitzer.

Heavy batteries are armed with the 4.7-inch howitzer, the 4.7-inch gun, or the 6-inch howitzer.

The 4.7-inch howitzer, drawn by eight horses, has very considerable mobility, and is really intermediate between the light and heavy calibers.

Horse batteries are assigned for service with the cavalry.

Light or mountain batteries and 4.7-inch howitzer batteries are assigned for service with infantry divisions.

Heavy batteries (4.7-inch gun and 6-inch howitzer) are assigned as army artillery.

On the basis of 3.16 guns for every thousand of infantry and cavalry, the General Staff and the War College have made the very modest recommendation that provision be immedi-

ately made for the manufacture of 1300 field guns. What we have built or approaching completion is not over 800 guns. What we have actually built is about 650 guns.

In his report for the year 1911, Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of War, said this:

> Attention has been repeatedly called to the very unprepared condition of the army with respect to reserve supplies of field artillery guns, carriages, and ammunition. We are less adequately supplied with field artillery material than with any other class of fighting equipment. There is not enough field artillery ammunition for the guns we now have for a single engagement such as were frequent in the Manchurian War. The manufacture of this class of material involves processes requiring much time and which there is no possible way to hasten. It follows, of course, that provision must be made for such material long in advance of its probable use. At the present rate of appropriations it is estimated that it would take more than fifty years to secure a reasonable supply of the field artillery guns, carriages, and ammunition that would be necessary in the event of a war. I invite particular attention to the following views of the Chief of Staff upon this subject: "The existing want of field artillery guns, carriages, and ammunition constitutes a grave

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MOUNTAIN BATTERY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY



COMPARATIVE STRENGTH IN FIELD ARTILLERY

menace to the public safety in case of war. Ordinary prudence would seem to dictate that the appropriations, especially for those field artillery guns, carriages, and ammunition, should be very greatly increased. Once a state of war exists with a first-class power there will be no opportunity to buy the material abroad or time to manufacture it at home, even if all available plants in this country were running at the maximum capacity, without such delay as would be fatal to our hopes of success. This shortage of field artillery material is the most serious feature of the present military situation, and one which should be immediately corrected. It constitutes a source of grave danger."

The Chief of Staff to whom Mr. Stimson referred was Major-General Leonard Wood. Although Wood, Stimson, and other of our military men and statesmen have continued to lay stress on the peril that lies in our lack of field guns and equipment, and although some progress has been made toward securing the most modern weapons of this character, the greatest shortage in the auxiliary arms of our defensive force is still in the field artillery.

Mr. Stimson's statement regarding our ammunition supply is approximately as accurate

to-day as it was at the time that it was printed. It is abundantly substantiated by figures which have been secured in connection with recent wars. A statistician in the French Army recently estimated that, during an engagement in France, a battery of the famous 75-millimeter (3-inch) guns averaged 600 rounds of ammunition per day for each gun. This figure is very high for a daily average. Some experts fix 350 rounds as a minimum which should be with the gun. It is conservative to say that there should be 1850 rounds with the gun, in the train and at the base.

We have ready in this country not much more than 300,000 rounds of field-gun ammunition. If all the field guns which our estimates call for were built and put into action at once, which is conceivable, and if all were of the same type, so that the ammunition could be interchanged and concentrated at the points where it might be most necessary, we should have in the whole country not more than sufficient ammunition for a single day's engagement.

If, in a desperate situation, such as we have

imagined, our enemy should be equipped according to the most advanced theories of field-gun artillery fire, he would have probably five field guns for every thousand of his infantry and cavalry. If we should have in the field the smallest force (420,000 rifles and sabers) with which, in the opinion of our General Staff, we could successfully engage in a defensive war, we should have about 1.6 guns for every thousand of our infantry and cavalry. An enemy would not venture to attack us without a fully adequate supply of ammunition and equipment, while we should have about 450 rounds for each gun as our total ammunition supply — about one fourth of the amount considered necessary. The volume of fire which an enemy could exert, both by reason of the greater number of his guns and the fact that he could afford to waste ammunition in searching out our positions, would be overwhelming. It is the opinion of military experts that our infantry would be wholly unable to advance in the face of a fire so much more deadly than anything we could exert.

AN AMERICAN FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY IN ACTION

Although there is a shortage of field guns even in our regular army, the greatest and most alarming shortage is in the militia. For years it has been intended that the militia should be equipped ultimately on the same basis as the regular army; yet our citizen force has only the 3-inch light gun, and this in numbers wholly out of proportion to the infantry. The total shortage in the militia is about 80 batteries, or 320 guns. Only one division of the organized militia, the Sixth of New York, has its full quota of field guns. The latest complete figures available show the shortage in other divisions to be as follows: —

The Fifth has one half its quota; the Seventh, one sixth; the Eighth, one half; the Ninth, one fourth; the Tenth, one sixth; the Eleventh, five twelfths; the Twelfth, one half; the Thirteenth, one third; the Fourteenth, five twelfths; the Fifteenth, five twelfths; and the Sixteenth, one third.

The cause for such a condition is easily found, and it will not be removed until some means can be devised for securing a greater

degree of coöperation in military matters between the individual States and the Federal Government. Field artillery is a very expensive arm of the service both to establish and to maintain, and it is an arm which would rarely be called upon to take part in solving any problem which might arise within the borders of an individual State. The obligation of a State to maintain its field artillery at top efficiency is purely a moral one, and since the Federal Government would be outside its rights in insisting that the necessary proportion of federal funds, supplied for militia purposes, be devoted to field artillery, it must be left to the States to decide whether or not their individual militia organizations are to be regarded as purely local military forces, or as parts, also, of the Army of the United States.

Brigadier-General A. L. Mills, as Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, in pointing out the dangers of this shortage of field guns in the militia in his annual report for 1913, said this: —

It is sufficient to state here that if the present so-called divisions are ever pitted against equal

forces, adequately provided with field artillery (and all foreign nations are so provided), we are foredoomed to defeat. Other factors being equal, to place the so-called divisions of the Organized Militia in such an action will cause such a disaster in morale, time, and actual loss of life as will draw on the heads of the responsible authorities maledictions from one end of the land to the other. The preventive is to now, in time of peace, either create the necessary field artillery units, or convert the relative excess of infantry into this arm.

The cause for the shortage of field guns in the organized militia is also back of the militia's inadequate cavalry equipment. At the last inspection, the militia was short 64 troops of cavalry. The cavalry, like the artillery, is an expensive arm to maintain. The militiaman is paid only during the time that he serves, but horses must be maintained constantly. In recent years there has grown up the erroneous impression that the days of cavalry are passing. Nothing is further from the truth. Cavalry is still indispensable. It is frequently used in both attack and defense, as well as in certain forms of scout duty.

In a description of an angle of the fighting in the now famous battle of the Marne, for example, a well-authenticated press dispatch from Paris contained this: —

A terrific cannonade at once opened upon the wood, which took fire, and, as a brisk wind was blowing, the flames soon turned the forest into an inferno. The Germans rushed out in great disorder, and the British, who were waiting, fell upon them hip and thigh. The men fought with terrible fury. The German commander concentrated all his energies upon saving the guns, but the British cavalry swept down upon the German horsemen that were trying to escort the guns to a place of safety. They went through them like an avalanche.

Once again it was clearly demonstrated that the cavalry arm is still one of the most effective that an army can possess when used at the proper moment and in the right way. Cavalry may be useless against men intrenched in kopjes, but in the open field it is as effective as in the days of the first Napoleon.

Not only did the cavalry prevent the German guns from escaping, but, by lightning-like delivery of charges, it prevented the gunners from taking up positions from which to work havoc on the British infantry.

The British guns were busy all the time, and the

Photo. by Paul Thompson

A FRENCH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY

accuracy of their firing soon made every fresh position taken up by the Germans untenable.

The British infantry went into the fray with terrible relish and zest. The men got over the ground at a great, swinging pace, and when they closed up for bayonets they were literally on the run and nothing could stop them. They went through the Germans like fire through flax. All the French gallopers are loud in their praises of the British in this battle.

Stand after stand was made by the Germans in the hope of stemming the tide of disaster until support should arrive, but the British knew the value of time as well as the Germans, and pushed the attack home so hotly that, according to the latest verbal reports, the Germans lost heavily in dead and wounded, while a large amount of artillery, great and small, big guns and rapid-firers, fell into British hands.

In time of war, we could count on not more than 9000 regular cavalry, and 6000 cavalry of the Organized Militia, poorly instructed and poorly mounted. We should be short at least 30,000 of what we should need for a well-balanced army of 500,000 men of all arms (including 40,000 coast artillery), and should have no reserve whatever.

The aeroplane is the eye of the artillery. The war in Europe, the first great struggle in which it has been applied, has demonstrated every day the tremendous aid rendered by an aeroplane in matters of strategy, in securing information regarding an enemy's movements and in assisting gunners in finding the range.

The United States ranks fourteenth in the nations of the world in what it pays for military aviation. Germany leads, with France, Russia, Italy, Austria, England, Belgium, and Japan, following in order. Greece, Bulgaria, Chili, Spain, and Brazil have all spent more than the United States for this most important arm of the service.

"Superiority of fire" does not mean alone a greater number of guns and a greater number of projectiles sent in the general direction of an enemy. Accuracy is as important as volume. The side which first finds the range has the initial advantage in modern battles. Rapidity in range-finding has depended almost wholly on the successful activity of aerial scouts.

We need not only the material and personnel and reserve for adequate field artillery. We must have, also, if we are to make sure that artillery fire is to be most effective, auxiliary arms in adequate proportion.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO

"MILITARISM" is the scare-word thrown into almost every serious discussion of our ability to defend ourselves. Whether or not it is something really to be afraid of, so far as Americans and American institutions and traditions are concerned, it is a most interesting thing when hauled out into the light and examined.

The problem of home defense has been faced since the primitive family squatted around in a circle and figured ways and means to thwart the hostile intentions of old Stone Hatchet and his gang, over across the river, and spent spare moments in fashioning newer and deadlier skull-crushing implements.

In some ways, especially in the science of killing, we have gone a long road since then; but we have not got away from the family idea, and we have only elaborated on the family council. We have learned to deal with each

other by means of words and scraps of paper. We have fought and loved, made peace and broken it, made promises and defiled them, gone cahoots, for a spell, with this family or that — all to protect or to enlarge the power of our own particular family, and with never a serious attempt to work out a scheme for one big, world-wide family.

Some families have said that the head of the house is boss; others have said the family is boss. So we have Prussia; so we have the United States of America — each sure that the other is wrong. Yet the American would not laugh at the idea of the Kaiser's "Ich und Gott" were he a Prussian; and the Prussian would not sneer at our little army and our bungling way of doing things military were he an American.

It cannot be expected that a family strictly brought up on the lines of a military autocracy, and one which has brought itself up on the broadest theories of democracy, can have many notions in common as to the ways and means of defending the home, save the great essential — to be willing, and ready, to fight.

Recent events across the Atlantic would seem to indicate that the German family, on instant notice, was both. Certain facts and figures set down in the course of previous chapters seem to suggest that the American people, though willing, are not at all ready.

The first is no proof that the Prussian idea is right any more than the second is proof that the American idea is wrong.

There is one fact which the average American finds it difficult to swallow. It is this: Fundadamentally, the German military idea is more democratic than ours. The application of the idea, of course, is diametrically opposed to the principles of democracy. Yet the German fighting force is directly from the citizenship. Democracy has swung away from the professional soldier of a hundred and fifty years ago. The British, ourselves — and China — of the world's great nations, are the only ones in whose military systems there is a survival of the days of Frederick the Great. With the abhorrence of anything approaching military rule, bred in the bone of the Anglo-Saxon, we

have taken elaborate means of insuring the subordination of the military to the civil authority.

Modern economists very generally agree that the danger of the professional soldier to a democracy, not so safe-guarded, is his eagerness to practice his profession — his hankering to try out new tools placed in his hands. Yet, go to the soldier of long experience, and he will tell you how silly this notion is. He will insist that the experienced soldier dreads war, because he knows what war is; just as a surgeon dreads to be operated upon, because he knows the danger and suffering that an operation entails.

Be that as it may, the fact is that, no matter how much we have subordinated him, we still have the professional soldier, and that in the Prussian system the professional soldier, the man who carries the gun, has been discarded for the citizen fighter. It is true, of course, that most of the officers, particularly the higher officers and the general staff, are all professionals, making a study of war their life-work.

Militarism is not a thing. It is not a form of

government. It is not even a system, wholly. It is a state of mind. That is a fact that we Americans find it difficult to get hold of. In Germany, militarism is superimposed on a democratic theory of national defense, evolved by Prussia after Napoleon, through sheer necessity. The armies that Prussia poured into the field in 1813 were no longer professional but citizen forces, poorly trained and organized, but fired with patriotism and enthusiasm. After the war, the Prussian rulers sagaciously made permanent the system found to be so effective. That system, though modified and enlarged upon, was substantially the same as that now in force. The victories of 1866 and 1870 thoroughly popularized it. The military alliance in 1866 between Prussia and all the other German States, with the union in 1871 of all the armies, opened the way for modeling the whole German military force after the Prussian pattern. The system of a citizen army, once laughed at by the French as a "sort of militia," is essentially the marvelous war machine of to-day.

The militarism so abhorrent to us is not this machine, not the German system of government, not compulsory military service, nor yet wholly the Prussian influence personified in the Kaiser and his advisers. No doubt all these elements go into it, but the militarism of Germany is the state of mind of the German people.

Such an impartial observer as R. M. Berry, in his "Germany of the Germans," has this to say of this German state of mind: —

That the army is the people can perhaps be asserted of Germany more than of any other nation. Every citizen considers service in the national defensive forces as a natural duty. He thinks it unworthy of any nation that its men should need to have attractions offered them in order to induce them to take their proper share in the defense of their country. Patriotism is a cult among the Germans. The German youth, as a general rule, looks forward with pleasure to the day when he is to don the uniform, and if, for some physical reason, he should be rejected, he feels that he has not quite proved his manliness. . . . The soldier is held up to him as the pattern which he should follow. . . . "For the people, but not by the people," is the motto that has been adopted by the Empire ever since Bismarck's effort to limit the spread of Social-

ism by introducing State-enforced thrift. . . . The masses of the people in Germany are always treated by the official classes as minors requiring guardianship with many restrictions. Since this method has been in vogue for so long a time, the Germans, almost to a man, expect all ameliorations of their condition, political as well as economical, to be proposed by the administrative authorities. They would not dream of initiating anything of the kind themselves. . . . The officer occupies a privileged position, which is inviolable by the civil authorities. He takes precedence everywhere. . . . There is in some quarters a very strong argument urged against this system of paternal government, — that it destroys individuality and takes away the personal will of the people. They become so used to obeying orders that they cannot think for themselves in politics. Spontaneity is not requisite for them. The Government sees to all things: the people only need to do what they are told. . . . One of the most striking features of German life is that the people have so little understanding of the way in which they are governed. In other things the German can recite long lists of data without the slightest hesitation, but in politics he replies with a blank look when questioned. It has never impressed him as necessary that he should comprehend politics. He is governed — as a rule well; that is sufficient for him.

How much of this is due to Prussian influence, how much to the personality of the Kaiser, how much to the leaders in the Prussian military cult, how much to the long compulsory military service, and how much is due to the racial temper of the German, writers disagree. That the Kaiser's "There is but one master in the country — myself. I will tolerate no other"; and "It is the soldier and the army, not majorities and parliamentary decisions that have forged the unity of the German Empire. It is on the army that my confidence rests"; and "The army and its sovereign head are the only guarantees of the safety of the empire and the peace of the world," are accepted seriously, cannot be questioned. To me it is inconceivable that, no matter what extreme measures might be taken to increase our preparedness against attack, militarism in any form, as we understand the militarism of Prussia, could gain a foothold in our nation.

But before we get around to talking about ourselves: —

Over across the way from the Kaiser and his family, there is a family that is boss of itself and thoroughly well able to take care of itself.

There is a world of difference between "the army is the people" and "the people are the army." There is just that much difference between Germany and Switzerland; between the Prussian system and the Swiss system; between Prussian militarism and Swiss democracy.

Yet, at bottom, the German idea and the Swiss idea are identical. The armies of both come directly from the citizenship. The difference is in the manner in which the citizenship has allowed the idea to be applied.

Switzerland, certainly the most democratic nation in Europe, held by some writers to be the world's model state since the adoption of the constitution of 1874, has no standing army. Its only permanent military officers are military trainers, selected by and under the supervision of the general government.

With a population of about 4,000,000 at an expenditure of less than $8,000,000 annually,

the Swiss Confederation can, in an hour of need, muster a fighting force of 500,000 men, trained and perfectly equipped.

With a population of over 90,000,000, it costs the Republic of the United States in the neighborhood of $90,000,000 to maintain a professional military organization which, in emergency could throw a bare 30,000 men, incompletely equipped, into line of battle. Where the money goes and what we get for it we have already seen. The subject is intricate.

To trace the Swiss eight millions into a first-class defensive force of half a million is exceedingly simple. The money goes for training, clothing, and equipment, and pay of soldiers and officers while they are with the colors. It is not wasted in politics because it is next to impossible to play politics with the Swiss military system.

Every male citizen of Switzerland, who is able, receives military training for certain short periods between the ages of seventeen and thirty-two. Every two years, for the first ten years, — that is, five times in all, — he

answers a call to the colors. His period of training is never more than ninety days for any one year and that only in the first year. If an artillery recruit, his training covers seventy-five days; if in the cavalry, ninety days; and if in the infantry, sixty days. The period with the colors shortens as he grows older. During his third, fifth, seventh, and ninth years, this period of training is from twelve to fifteen days. He is paid only during the time he is with the colors. More than that, so far as is possible, his military training is made to follow the lines of his occupation. If he is a baker, he finds his place in the commissary; if he is an electrician, he can enter the engineers or the signal corps. The Swiss soldier has as good a chance of becoming an officer as any of his fellows. Officers are drawn from the ranks according to seniority. The appointing power rests with the Government.

"Compulsory service!"

Those are the other scare-words, the teammates of "militarism."

The Swiss military training is the law of the

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SWISS AND GERMAN SOLDIERS AT THE FRONTIER

land, certainly, even if it has become so by vote of all the people. Its relation to democracy depends to some extent on whether you argue that a person can be compelled to do what he wants to do.

The Swiss youth, from his earliest school days, is taught that the army is for defense only. Patriotism is interwoven in his development. He discerns no line between civic duty and military duty. He learns to look upon each as essential to real citizenship. By the time he leaves school he is not a raw recruit. He has already had some military training. He is ready and eager to join the colors and to complete his education. Certainly he does not regard as undemocratic or unreasonable the requirement that he must know how to fight in order that he may take an intelligent part in the defense of his country, any more than we consider undemocratic and unreasonable the requirement that we must know how to read in order that we may take an intelligent part in the political affairs of our country.

Australia is another country which has been

working out a system of defense that has attracted the attention of the world's great powers. Within a very few years the military theory there has developed along lines which have converted a hired police force into a powerful organization of citizen soldiery.

The responsibility for the defense of Australia prior to 1870 rested on British troops which were quartered in the largest cities. The chief function of these troops was that of a convict guard. In any emergency where war threatened, the only measures of defense which could be taken, except those which would be afforded by the professional soldiers, depended upon the organization of volunteers.

It was in 1870 that all British troops were withdrawn from Australia. It was then that small bodies of permanent forces were formed, and it was the intention to build around these small detachments an organization of citizen fighters. The first experiment, in 1883 to 1884, was a partially paid volunteer militia.

A system of military instruction in schools for boys was established at this time. This

system of cadets was purely of a volunteer nature, and did not offer the means of military training to boys who could not, or for any reason did not, attend these schools. It was ten years before the system was so altered and extended that opportunity was given for the training of boys who were qualified to take a part in the defense of the country, but who did not attend school.

The system was found to be unsatisfactory to so marked a degree that in 1909 compulsory military training became the law. This law became operative on June 30, 1911, when the volunteer system of military training came to an end and compulsory training began.

The military and naval forces were divided into permanent and citizen organizations; the one bound for a definite term of service, the other not so bound. Until 1911 the permanent forces were designated as the militia and were paid, and the remaining citizen soldiers were classed as volunteers, not ordinarily paid for their service, but provided with a reserve which included members of rifle clubs and men

who had seen active service at some other time.

Up to the time that the compulsory training law became operative, enlistment was voluntary in time of peace. Between the ages of eighteen and sixty years, all male citizens were declared to be members of the army and liable to service, in time of war, within the territorial limits of Australia only. The departure from the old theory was a most radical one. The Act of 1909 was the direct outcome of a popular belief that the defense of Australia under the volunteer system was wholly insufficient.

The important section of the new law reads as follows: —

All male inhabitants of Australia (excepting those who are exempted by this Act), who have resided therein for six months and are British subjects, shall be liable to be trained as follows: (*a*) from 12 to 14 years of age in the junior cadets; (*b*) from 14 to 18 years of age in the senior cadets; (*c*) from 18 to 26 years of age in the citizen forces; *provided* that, except in time of imminent danger or war, the last year of service in the citizen forces shall be limited to one registration or one muster parade.

At about the age when the average American youth is tormenting his neighbors with "bean-shooters" and making the life of the family cat almost unendurable with the inevitable air-gun, the Australian youth is beginning to get the beginnings of a training that will eventually turn him out as a trained unit of his country's defense.

On July 1 of his twelfth year, every Australian boy who has been found to be physically, morally, and mentally fit, becomes a junior cadet. The Government gives him a hat, a shirt, breeches, puttees, and shoes. He receives ninety hours of military training each year for two years, when he graduates into the ranks of the senior cadets. For four years he is put through a course of drilling, marching, disciplining, the handling of arms, physical training, guard duty, and elementary tactics. Each year he receives a minimum of four four-hour drills, twelve two-hour drills, and twenty-four one-hour drills. Upon entering the senior cadets, he becomes the proud possessor of a cadet rifle and belt. If, as a marksman, he

can meet certain stipulated requirements, he is allowed to handle a man's-size gun and to take part in target practice with the service rifle.

Military experts, comparing the rifle fire of the soldiers of the European nations involved in the present war, invariably comment on the marked superiority of the British over the German riflemen. They agree that this superiority is due to the fact that the Englishman finds his target before he pulls the trigger. Before the missile leaves its chamber Tommy Atkins is pretty sure on the one thing that the German has the vaguest notion about — where death in a steel jacket is going to. Likewise, those theories once propounded by profound students of things military, that rifle fire and other forms of close-range killing would play a very small part in modern warfare, have been exploded by what is happening every day in Europe.

The British passion for expert marksmanship is reflected in the Australian military system. Not only does the senior cadet have the

opportunity of reaching his ambition of shooting with a real war gun, but he knows that when he is nineteen years old he is to become a full-fledged member of the citizen force of his country.

At that time he receives, in addition to his previous equipment, two woolen shirts, two pairs of breeches, an overcoat, a hat, a sleeping-cap, two pairs of leggings, two pairs of shoes, a kit pack, service rifle, and bayonet.

As a citizen soldier, he must each year receive not less than the equivalent of sixteen whole days' training, eight of which must be in camps of continuous training.

From the time of his junior cadetship, the natural tendencies of the youth are observed, and to a great extent he is allowed to follow his bent in fitting himself for a part in the country's defense. By the time he is past his junior and senior cadetships, what arm of the service he is best fitted for is usually very apparent. From the time that he is graduated from the ranks of the senior cadets until he is twenty-five years old, he receives infantry and cavalry

drill or staff corps training. To attend one muster parade is all that is required of him in his twenty-sixth year, when he is discharged from "active service." Not until he is sixty years of age, however, does he cease to be subject to a call to the colors in time of war. To win a discharge in his twenty-sixth year he must be able to show twelve annual certificates of proficiency, which have been issued by a board of officers by whom he is examined at the end of every year of his training. If in any year he fails to pass the efficiency board of examiners, he must repeat that year of training.

The citizen soldier of Australia receives promotion based entirely upon merit.

Under the Defense Act, the following classes of exemptions exist: persons physically, mentally, or morally unfit, members and officers of Parliament, judges, police, prison employees, ministers of religion, lighthouse keepers, and physicians and nurses of public hospitals. The Governor-General may by proclamation vary or extend these exemptions or he may exempt

specified areas. Persons whose religion or belief prohibits them from bearing arms may be exempted from service in the combatant branches, but are liable for service in the supply departments, and in every case the burden of proof rests upon the person claiming exemption.

If a parent or guardian fails or refuses to register a son or ward who is of the proper age for service, or if any employer, of the type inclined to subordinate the national interest to his greed for money, interferes in any way with the military service of his employees, he is subject to a heavy fine. Employers are not required to pay employees during the time they are on military duty.

Now the Australian Army is the manhood of the country — trained for military defense.

The Swiss Army, though the systems differ in certain details, is the same.

The United States Army is an organization of a few thousand professional soldiers, backed by the manhood of the country, untrained.

American manhood is in no way inferior to Swiss or Australian manhood.

American patriotism is in no way inferior to Swiss or Australian patriotism.

We pride ourselves, with reason, on our independent spirit and the courage to back it. Spirit and courage are about all we have in a military way. Are they sufficient for any situation we may find ourselves in?

Our theory of defense, laid down by Washington, and changed very little since then, is generally considered to be both sound and adequate. That theory contemplates a small professional army as a nucleus combined with the organized militia as a first line of defense, and the whole backed by the citizenship. Administration after administration has pointed out our failure to apply this theory and the perils that lurk in our negligence. Taft, Roosevelt, and Wilson, Root, Stimson, and Garrison, as well as the chief men of our military establishment, have all at intervals had something to say on this subject.

Woodrow Wilson, in his message to Con-

gress, during the closing days of 1914, said this: —

We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms. It will be right enough — right American policy, based upon our accustomed principles and practices — to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline which our young men will learn to value. It is right that we should provide it not only, but that we should make it as attractive as possible, and so induce our young men to undergo it at such times as they can command a little freedom and can seek the physical development they need, for mere health's sake, if for nothing more. Every means by which such things can be stimulated is legitimate, and such a method smacks of true American ideas. It is right, too, that the National Guard of the States should be developed and strengthened by every means which is not inconsistent with our obligations to our own people or with the established policy of our Government. And this, also, not because the

time or occasion specially calls for such measures, but because it should be our constant policy to make these provisions for our national peace and safety.

More than this carries with it a reversal of the whole history and character of our policy. More than this, proposed at this time, permit me to say, would mean merely that we had lost our self-possession, that we had been thrown off our balance by a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should make us ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation for trouble.

In his Annual Report of 1914, Lindley M. Garrison, as Secretary of War, had the following comment to make on this point: —

It would be premature to attempt now to draw the ultimate lessons from the war in Europe. It is an imperative duty, however, to heed so much of what it brings home to us as is incontrovertible and not to be changed by any event, leaving for later and more detailed and comprehensive consideration what its later developments and final conclusions may indicate.

For orderly treatment certain preliminary considerations may be usefully adverted to. It is, of course, not necessary to dwell on the blessings of

COLLEGE STUDENTS LEARNING THE FINE POINTS OF TRENCH-DIGGING

A STUDENT SOLDIERS' MESS

peace and the horrors of war. Every one desires peace, just as every one desires health, contentment, affection, sufficient means for comfortable existence, and other similarly beneficent things. But peace and the other states of being just mentioned are not always or even often solely within one's own control. Those who are thoughtful and have courage face the facts of life, take lessons from experience, and strive by wise conduct to attain the desirable things, and by prevision and precaution to protect and defend them when obtained. It may truthfully be said that eternal vigilance is the price which must be paid in order to obtain the desirable things of life and to defend them.

In collective affairs the interests of the group are confided to the Government, and it thereupon is charged with the duty to preserve and defend these things. The Government must exercise for the Nation the precautionary, defensive, and preservative measures necessary to that end. All governments must therefore have force — physical force — i.e., military force — for these purposes. The question for each nation when this matter is under consideration, is, How much force should it have and of what should that force consist?

We already have our nucleus for defense — a very expensive one — well trained, well officered, and moderately well equipped. For a

nucleus it is pretty well scattered. Washington, of course, could not foresee that we should have to maintain fighting men at such distances as the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama.

Back of this nucleus, in accordance with the original idea, we have the militia, each state organization adequate for local needs, no doubt, but woefully lacking as a first line of national defense — its theoretical function. Our militia as a whole is so incompletely organized and so inadequately equipped that it would be next to powerless if pitted against a well-prepared foe under modern methods of warfare.

As a nation, we have a lot of family pride. We are warlike, but not military. We are quick to resent insult and very confident of our ability to maintain our position. With unlimited military resources there is no doubt that we are abundantly able to take care of ourselves. But we are apt to forget that war has developed from a glacier to an avalanche; that modern international blows are struck unexpectedly and with lightning quickness; and that in a time of desperate and sudden necessity, unde-

veloped resources of men and materials would be as useless as would be an undeveloped gold mine in Alaska in a Wall Street panic.

Our family has men, money, and materials more than sufficient for any military need. But we lack group and individual team work. No one has yet devised a successful scheme for securing effective military coöperation between the States and the Federal Government. Jasper and Henry and Brother Hiram are all tied up in their local troubles. They are fighters, every last one of them, but they have n't had time nor a desire to spend the money necessary to prepare themselves for trouble that might involve everybody. Such an emergency has appeared to us all to be the very remotest possibility. Satisfied with our natural strength, we have had but the vaguest concern as to what shape we should be in if we should be brought suddenly to face the necessity of getting together for the defense of all.

There is a growing conviction that this is not wisdom and that it is not fair to the little body of men whom we hire to protect us.

This conviction, for a long time, has been crystallizing, in some quarters, into a determination to find a way out. Some of our statesmen and military men, notably former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and former Chief of Staff Leonard Wood, have been grappling with the problem. The Swiss idea and the military theories of other nations have been given the closest study.

A start has already been made; a beginning of a system of genuine and adequate citizen defense which already has received the endorsement of President Wilson, Secretary of War Garrison, President Hibben of Princeton, President Lowell of Harvard, President Hadley of Yale, and other men of equal standing.

And not one of them suggests the peril of militarism!

CHAPTER IX

THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR

Those gentlemen who have been telling us that the United States is the only first-class nation in the world which has no military reserve must have a care lest they be put down as jingos, attempting to create hysteria by inflammable and inaccurate utterances.

We have a reserve. It consists of 16 men. At least, it did up to November 15, 1914. Some of it may have departed this life by the time these pages reach the press; but the chances are that it is safe and accurate to say that our reserve to-day is about what it was in the middle of November, 1914.

We have a reserve law, too. Under its provisions a man intending to enlist in the regular army has the privilege at the time of his enlistment of expressing a wish that he be discharged on furlough when he has served his term, and be held subject to recall to the colors at any

time his services may be needed. In twenty-four months this law produced the 16 reservists.

And there we are.

The law is a joke — just as much of a joke as the "American Landsturm." If by any chance war should be brought our way by any first-class nation on earth, the joke would instantly become a tragedy; and it is the purpose of this volume to serve in its small way in presenting facts and figures that may assist the American people in reaching some conclusion as to whether our small regular army and our incomplete and poorly organized militia are sufficient military protection for this country.

The territory of continental United States is about 3,027,000 square miles, with a population of about 99,000,000. There are 590,800 square miles in Alaska and a population of about 65,000. We have spent $400,000,000 as an investment in the Panama Canal. In Hawaii, the population of 192,000 is contained within 6500 square miles. The area of Porto Rico is about 3600 square miles, with a popu-

lation of 1,118,000. In the Philippine Islands, with 127,800 square miles, there is a population of 7,640,000.

Our military responsibilities over this scattered area are both heavy and complicated. The distribution of our regular army of less than 90,000 men has been described in detail in a previous chapter.

The most superficial study of our standing military forces and the duties which devolve upon them, reveals immediately the utter folly of contending that our available military forces could cope successfully with even as small an army as 200,000 trained men of any first-class power. In his Report for 1914, Lindley M. Garrison, as Secretary of War, compared our peace and war strength with those of other nations, as shown on the following page.

Mr. Garrison's figures for the United States are generous. They include the Philippine scouts and the organized militia. As has been previously pointed out, there is a vast difference between paper strength and actual strength. It is the opinion of those who have given the

	Area (square miles)	Population	Peace strength	Total trained war strength
Germany.....	208,830	64,903,423	620,000	4,000,000
France.....	207,054	38,961,945	560,000	3,000,000
Russia.....	8,647,657	160,095,200	1,200,000	4,500,000
Great Britain and colonies	11,467,294	396,294,752	254,500	800,000
Italy.....	110,550	32,475,253	275,000	1,200,000
Austria-Hungary.....	261,035	49,418,596	360,000	2,000,000
Japan.....	147,655	53,875,390	230,000	1,200,000
Turkey.....	1,186,874	35,764,876	420,000	1,200,000
Spain.....	194,783	19,503,008	115,000	300,000
Switzerland...	15,976	3,741,971	140,000	275,000
Sweden.....	172,876	5,476,441	75,000	400,000
Belgium.....	11,373	7,074,910	42,000	180,000
United States.	3,026,789	98,781,324	97,760	[1]225,170

[1] Including Philippine scouts and Organized Militia.

closest study to this subject that the actual and immediate war strength of our regular army and militia combined, including combatants and non-combatants and troops in foreign service, is not more than 140,000 men; and that the total armed force which we could assemble on instant notice at any one point within the continental limits of the United States, a force which could be looked to for immediate resistance of invasion, is not more than 50,000 men, including regular troops and militia. The whole outfit could be put into the

Yale Bowl, and there would be room left for a good-sized crowd of admiring sisters.

Mr. Garrison's figures for Switzerland, on the other hand, are most conservative. Switzerland really has no standing army. Its permanent establishment consists of a general staff and a small number of recruiting, supply, and instructor officers. With a population of 4,000,000, Switzerland, in 1912, had a military force of 490,340 men, fully organized and equipped, well trained and disciplined, and instantly available. Incidentally, the military expense of the Government for that year was $8,299,941, or $16.77 per man. Our regular soldier costs us about $1000 each year. Mr. Garrison's figures for England, France, and Russia were low. The peace armies of these countries were greatly augmented subsequent to his report.

Back of our hired regular force, and back of our militia, we have 16 trained men as listed reservists!

Back of the whole is the citizenship — a

citizenship second to none in the world in hardihood, courage, intelligence, and patriotism. That this citizenship, in any conflict



WE HAVE 16 TRAINED MEN AS LISTED RESERVISTS

with any power on earth, would ultimately triumph, we none of us question.

What do we want to pay in life, property, and treasure, for ultimate triumph? About that question centers the whole military problem of the United States. There are two possible answers to it: —

Either we can continue to ignore the principles of our military policy;

Or we can devise means whereby our whole citizenship will have opportunity to receive military training.

In other words: —

We shall have a reserve;

Or we shall not have a reserve.

Or still another way: —

We shall continue to throw the whole burden of first defense on a handful of professional hired soldiers;

Or we shall undertake to fit ourselves intelligently to back our hired men in time of national peril.

It all means that: —

We shall continue to invite trouble by our unpreparedness for it;

Or we shall discourage foreign trouble-seekers by being ready for any military emergency.

Those of us who spend our week-ends in automobiles would feel a certain sense of disgrace if our neighbors should catch us start-

ing out without our extra tire. Some of us are inclined to surround ourselves with an atmosphere of disgusting prosperity by packing along two extras; and if we head away on a particularly long, rough, dangerous, or important trip, a few of us carry a whole extra set.

What is more, we take pains in providing tires that fit our rims. Think of it! We make sure that tires and rims match. Why, we even insist that the threads of our extra spark plugs shall match up with the threads that are to receive them; and that extra parts shall be especially designed for our particular machine. Yet nobody ever accuses us of letting these precautions for safety, convenience, and comfort interfere with our commercial, professional, or domestic duties and activities. It is most remarkable.

Now I am not ready to admit that this digression is far-fetched.

Our army is a machine — a most expensive one. A nation keeps a military machine on hand for use in emergency. Its efficiency as a

nation's economic possession depends upon the fighting power it can develop *and maintain* in conflict.

As soon as a military machine is used in actual warfare, it immediately becomes subject to heavy losses. Wear and tear begins. Parts are broken, destroyed, lost through sickness or desertion, or stolen.

Not all the losses are directly due to violence. Some come through disease, some through the hard going — the hardships of a campaign. In its marches to Sedan the Prussian Guard lost 5000 men. The Guard had to arrive at a given place on time, and the necessary speed of marching was more destructive than battle. The members of that Guard were trained soldiers. Raw, soft troops would never have arrived at all, in all probability.

We spend large amounts of money to maintain military forces through long periods of peace which we count upon to meet a comparatively brief emergency in war. It would appear to be sound economics as well as ordinary horse sense that the war efficiency of our

machine should be commensurate with the money we spend on it in time of peace.

It is not — by any means.

In spite of the fact that we know that our fighting machine will, in war, immediately deteriorate unless we provide for replacing loss and destruction of its parts, both trivial and vital, we have, throughout our military history, persisted in ignoring the peril that is involved in our neglect to apply the sound and fundamental principles of our established military policy.

It has been proved by cold figures and broad averages that in modern warfare any given unit loses near to fifty per cent of its initial strength during the first six months of a conflict. If the parts making up this loss are not replaced with other identical parts, the fighting machine loses at least half its power. If the lost and destroyed parts are replaced by inferior and ill-fitting ones, the initial effectiveness of the machine is destroyed in the ratio of the rapidity with which the new parts can be remodeled and adjusted.

Remodeling and readjusting mean careful training. Training can be accomplished economically in time of peace or at a frightful cost during the progress of actual war.

The United States is the only great nation of the world that chooses the latter course. In all the wars in our history, the units first sent into the field have shrunk; and as they dwindled, new bodies, untrained, and under untrained officers, have been organized, and sent into the line of battle. The results from the Revolution down have been a demonstration that continued and persistent fighting is impossible under such a system. With almost every battle followed by exhaustion, disorganization, and a period of inactivity, our wars have dragged out their weary course, taking a toll of life and treasure out of all proportion to the sacrifice that would be necessary under a system of military preparedness.

Our military peace organization is the automobile stripped down to the motor, chassis, and driving gears. Not only should there be at hand the necessary spare parts, but there

should be accessible the means for building it up completely without confusion at a moment's notice.

The army was never intended to be more than the peace skeleton for an adequate war force. Our forebears went on the assumption that we would supply ourselves with the means of expansion. That we have not done so can be charged to the negligence of our legislators, not to those in charge of our military affairs. An adequate reserve of trained men would mean that, at the present time and in the future, our standing forces should be kept at the absolute minimum consistent with the military obligations devolving upon us in time of peace, and our security in the face of a threatened invasion.

Suppose that an invasion actually threatened. Suppose that, in the opinion of our military experts, an army of 100,000 men were necessary successfully to repel an attack by land. Not only should we have to put these 100,000 trained men into the field, but we should have to maintain a force of that size

throughout a campaign. We should have to avoid, first of all, a lowering of the efficiency of the initial force through the absorption of raw recruits to replace the first losses. We should assume, with good ground, that during the first six months of fighting, we should lose about fifty per cent of our initial fighting line. If the training of recruits were begun at once, some of the new men would be ready to go to the front before the expiration of the six months. Perhaps we might be able so to train 25,000 raw recruits. In order, therefore, to maintain 100,000 men at top efficiency during six months of war, our fighting force would have to have an initial strength of 125,000 trained men.

All this is based on the assumption of our military organization being without trained reserves. With the average cost of each soldier $1000, this force would cost us $125,000,000 per year.

Suppose that, under these same circumstances, we had at hand a trained reserve of 50,000 men. Our professional military establishment, then, could be limited to 75,000 men,

and it has been estimated that the cost per year for maintaining such a force at top efficiency would not be more than $75,000,000. The war effectiveness of such a peace organization would be as high as the larger standing army.

We can't seem to get it out of our national head that the "Indian Days" are past. In those days the longer we held a man in the service, the better he became acquainted with the ways of the redskin and the more efficient as an Indian fighter he was. To-day we need men ready for any emergency — sound in body and trained for modern warfare. Yet we persist in looking upon our army as a police force. The longer a policeman deals with crooks and criminals, the more efficient he is in locating criminals and suppressing crime. Only in actual warfare is this true of the soldier. In time of peace he can only study military science and keep his body in trim to apply what he has learned. Our police-force system of enlistment, as a matter of pure business, is ridiculous. We take a man into the army, train him, and pay

him the most at the time that he is least efficient — when he is on the down grade. And we have very few of him, at that.

Suppose we took him for a very short period of enlistment, and at the end of it returned him to civil life, thereafter calling him to the colors only for a few days' brushing up each year, and in time of war. He would cost not more than $100 a year. The regular soldier costs about $1000. For what we pay for each regular, we could have ten reservists. And the reservist would be in all respects the equal of the regular as a unit of defense.

The regular army was designed originally to be, among other things, a training school. It has proved its efficiency in this respect, but year after year we have continued the policy of educating and training our citizens who have enlisted in the regular army, and then of returning them to private life without providing any means of assuring ourselves of their further services if ever required.

We shall, of course, always need a regular force sufficient for garrison duty at home and

abroad. But if we ever decide to substitute, for minimum defensive strength at maximum cost, maximum strength at minimum cost, we are going to find the trained reserve the easy and democratic way out.

The time that must be consumed in making an efficient soldier out of a raw recruit in the regular army training-school is a matter concerning which there is a rather wide divergence of opinion. Averaging the views of military men of long experience, it can be safely said that the regular army can turn out a soldier in twelve months. From my talks with leading military men, I am inclined to the belief that a recruit of average intelligence and good habits can be made an effective fighting unit within six months. It is a fact that has been established that any young man of good health and average mental equipment can be fitted for military service within that time. Under a system of intensive training, the experiment has been successfully tried in other countries.

What is more, there is no good reason why

the militia organizations, as well as the regular army, should not be useful as military training-schools.

Should Congress suddenly decide, after long years of inactivity, that it is in the interest of the nation to put something beside high-sounding utterances complimentary to the manhood of the nation behind our hired soldiers and our militiamen, and should it enact legislation under which a reserve strength could be built up, we should still be without the one great essential for turning recruits into trained soldiers. We have hardly enough officers for our present regular army, and not nearly enough efficient officers to bring our militia to the degree of organization and effectiveness which it should have. Theoretically, we should have sufficient officers in the regular army to assist in the training of the militia, and if we should decide that it would be good business for us, in addition, to have a reserve, we should have absolutely no officers available to handle the detail of organizing, training, and administering the reserve, not to mention the fact

that if the regular army should be expanded with reserve troops, we should not have anywhere near enough leaders to handle the larger force in time of war.

"If we were called upon to mobilize to meet a first-class power," said General Leonard Wood, recently, "we should require immediately several thousand officers. Where are we to get them? This is a matter of vital importance and one which should be attended to at once, and not left to the rush, hurry, and confusion preceding the war."

A possible answer to General Wood's question will be given further on.

Should we find a way to supply ourselves with a reserve of men and of officers sufficient to bring the regular army and the militia to war strength in absolute uniformity of organization, the final problem would be the establishment of a reserve of war material. Our military forces, particularly the militia, are not only without the equipment that would be essential to any successful campaign, but we have taken no means whatever of supplying

anything like a reserve supply of weapons, particularly field guns, ammunition, supplies, hospital trains, and the equipment necessary to efficient operation of other auxiliary arms of the service.

There are two vital aspects of this situation: The first is the safety of the nation; and the second is the unfairness, which in time of war will amount to criminal negligence on our part, in putting such a burden of responsibility as now exists upon men who have voluntarily stepped forward as willing to train themselves for the defense of the nation.

President Taft emphasized the fact that a large body of men does not necessarily constitute an army, and that a volunteer enlisted to-day, or a militiaman enrolled to-morrow, cannot be expected, no matter what his desire may be, to be an effective fighting unit at once.

What has been accomplished in our military history by the soldiers who have made up our forces under the slipshod system which has continued since the Revolution, is the highest tribute to the spirit and valor of the individual

American soldier, whether regular or militiaman.

Our unfairness toward the man who voluntarily assumes his share of the burden of the national defense was emphasized by General Richard Henry Lee, commander of the famous Partisan Legion. Years after the Revolution, Lee said this: "A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle."

CHAPTER X

WELL?

WHAT are we going to do about it?

Probably, either we are going to assume that there is no need to do anything about it, or we are going to take the position that, because there is peril in our present state of military preparedness, there is necessity for deciding upon some means of increasing our military strength.

Some of us hold very firmly to the belief that our system in its present application is sufficient for any possible emergency which we might face, and point to the successful and glorious outcome of every armed struggle in which we have been engaged.

Others of us are inclined to the belief that those very conflicts furnish the strongest proof of the unnecessary disasters and needless sacrifices that go with military unreadiness.

Assuming that a first-class nation might de-

cide that it would be profitable and advisable to attack us by land, would an immediately available force of 50,000 trained men, plus our patriotism, be adequate for our defense? Evidently such a force, particularly if ill-equipped, poorly organized, and not supplied with sufficient field artillery and ammunition, would be no match against trained troops, perfectly equipped. The element, then, upon which we would rely to give us superiority and ultimate success, would be our patriotism.

It was an inspiring picture which William J. Bryan, as Secretary of State, is quoted as having painted — "The President knows that if this country needed a million men and needed them in a day, the call could go out at sunrise, and the sun would go down on a million men under arms." But it is a picture without historical background. Mr. Bryan, no doubt, in common with the great majority of people unexpert in things military, has had neither the time nor the inclination to study the requirements of military science. Among those of us whose information is of the most general

SKIRMISH DRILL AT THE BURLINGTON CAMP

OPEN-ORDER PRACTICE AT BURLINGTON, VERMONT

character, nothing is more common than mistaking military resources for military strength. This misconception is particularly characteristic of the American people. Our histories give us the record of our triumphs in the Revolution, in the War of 1812, and succeeding conflicts; and since nearly all of these wars were, for the most part, begun by forces of militia and volunteers, we have very naturally formed the conviction that, since our system has been ultimately successful, there is little pressing need for altering it.

We are apt to forget that, in relating the events of our wars, our historians have for the most part limited themselves to describing the battles that have been fought, without laying much stress upon the delays and unnecessary disasters which accompanied them; nor has it been pointed out to us that in nearly every instance our wars have been so protracted that the national resources have been well-nigh exhausted.

An understanding of the enormous life and treasure loss which has attended our refusal to

carry out the principles of our military policy would surely lead to prompt remedy of the most dangerous of our present weaknesses.

Argue as we may, we cannot evade the fact that all our wars have been prolonged for lack of preparation, and that often the news of humiliating defeat instead of victory has plunged the people into mourning.

Patriotism cannot be relied upon to produce at once very large forces of volunteers. It is not pleasant to reflect that, out of every five men who went into the Union forces during the Civil War, one was a deserter; that early in the second year of the war (August 4, 1862) President Lincoln had to resort to the draft, and that before the struggle had continued two years Congress was compelled to adopt general conscription; that the only real land victory we won in the War of 1812 was after the war was over; that a French navy and army played a powerful rôle at Yorktown; that Washington himself, in November, 1775, after most heroic efforts to assemble an army of 20,000 men around Boston, wrote this: —

The trouble I have in the arrangement of the Army is really inconceivable. Many of the officers sent in their names to serve in expectation of promotion; others stood aloof to see what advantage they could make for themselves, while a number, who had declined, have again sent in their names to serve. So great has the confusion arising from these and many other perplexing circumstances been that I found it absolutely impossible to fix this very interesting business exactly on the plan resolved on in the conference, though I have kept up to the spirit of it as near as the nature and necessity of the case would permit.

The difficulty with the soldiers is as great, indeed, more so, if possible, than with the officers. They will not enlist until they know their colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and captain, so that it was necessary to fix the officers the first thing, which is, at last, in some manner done, and I have given out enlisting orders. . . .

There must be some other stimulus, besides love of their country, to make men fond of the service. . . .

The number enlisted since my last is 2540 men. I am sorry to be necessitated to mention to you the egregious want of public spirit which reigns here. Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause of their country, which I vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted

must have a furlough, which I have been obliged to grant to fifty at a time, from each regiment. The Connecticut troops, upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, indeed, if possible, more so than the people of this colony. Our situation is truly alarming, and of this General Howe is well apprised, it being the common topic of conversation when the people left Boston last Friday. No doubt when he is reinforced he will avail himself of the information. . . . Such a dearth of public spirit and such want of virtue, such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another in this great change of military arrangement I never saw before, and pray God's mercy that I may never be witness to again. What will be the end of these maneuvers is beyond my scan. I tremble at the prospect. We have been till this time enlisting about 3500 men. To engage these I have been obliged to allow furloughs as far as fifty men to a regiment, and the officers, I am persuaded, indulge as many more. The Connecticut troops will not be prevailed upon to stay longer than their term, saving those who have enlisted for the next campaign, and are mostly on furlough; such mercenary spirit pervades the whole that I should not be at all surprised at any disaster that may happen. In short, after the last of this month our lines will be so weakened that the minute men and militia must be called in for their defense, and these being

under no kind of government themselves will destroy the little subordination I have been laboring to establish, and run me into one evil while I am endeavoring to avoid another; but the less must be chosen. . . .

Our enlistment goes on slowly. By the returns last Monday, only 5917 men are engaged for the ensuing campaign, and yet we are told that we shall get the number wanted, as they are only playing off to see what advantages are to be made, and whether a bounty cannot be extorted, either from the public at large or individuals, in case of a draft.

Similar instances of the disappointing results of reliance upon volunteer enlistments can be found almost without number in the full records of our military operations. While these facts may not be pleasant to contemplate, perhaps it is high time that we faced them. In the opinion of able military men and statesmen, these instances do not indicate any lack of patriotism, but do demonstrate that a system which depends wholly upon patriotism to produce armed forces in time of necessity is imperfect.

All our history gives a complete demonstra-

tion of the fact that our great weaknesses have been the persistent use of raw troops; the lack of an expansive organization; and voluntary enlistments with large bounties. Where men, enlisted for a period of three months, as at Bladensburg, are thrown against veteran troops, no matter what the ultimate result of a campaign may be, needless sacrifice and prolonged fighting is inevitable. Military men agree that the excellence of the troops shown at the close of the Civil War was due, not to the fact that they were volunteers, but to the fact that their long term of service enabled them to become expert soldiers with discipline and a knowledge of military science to back their courage. Every battlefield of the Civil War after 1861 gave proof of the valor of the trained American soldier, but it must be remembered that, in producing such soldiers, nearly every family in the land was in mourning, and the nation was all but overwhelmed with a debt with which we are still burdened.

A people forget easily. Already we are ceas-

ing to dwell on the costly sacrifices of the Civil War; and yet, unless we take some means of profiting by past experience, and devise some system of national military preparedness, we shall continue a condition that would, if war should come, involve the nation in the same difficulties, and expose the country to the same terrible sacrifices as in the past.

Probably no man in the history of our nation was better qualified to speak as an authority on the question of national defense than was Washington. Through all his writing runs the plea for trained citizens and uniformity of organization. At the time that Washington wrote, the line between the militia and the volunteer forces of the country was an indefinite one.

It has been in comparatively recent years that we have drawn a clear-cut distinction between unorganized volunteers and organized volunteers. The peril of being unprepared to put trained citizens into the field on short notice has been sounded by military men and statesmen from the time of Washington down.

ARE WE READY?

Elihu Root, in 1904, declared: —

> One . . . field of great importance remains to be covered by legislation: the establishment of an adequate system for raising, training, and officering the volunteer forces of the future. It is of first importance, that the distinction between volunteers and militia shall be observed.

Our Secretaries of War and our army officers, in administration after administration, have pounded away on the same point.

In recent years we have created machinery which could give us not only an efficient regular army, but an adequate and uniform divisional organization of well-equipped and well-trained militia.

We have shown a disinclination to use the machinery. Yet none of us would question the fact that a nation's success in war depends upon the organization and application of its military resources. Military resources are men, material, and money.

The organization of these three depends on the wisdom of the statesmen. The military men can only advise. Our Constitution gives

Congress the power to raise and support armies. A Congress thoroughly informed on military matters, and awake to the perils that follow in the wake of negligence, would mean a military system wholly adequate for any emergency. No matter what the skill, efficiency, and courage of the individual soldier may be, the responsibility of defeat or victory in a war lies as heavy on the civil as on the military authority.

American battles have not been wholly won or lost in the field. A close scrutiny reveals that they may be lost in the Cabinet room, in the dome of the Capitol, or in the private office of the Secretary of War. Wherever the ultimate responsibility may lie, it is the young men of the country who die, and it is the whole people of the country who suffer. Legislative negligence is an offense against the citizenship of the country, and there can be no doubt that in the event of disaster, due wholly to the failure of Congress to enact laws that would have insured national safety, the American people would call their representatives in Congress by their right names.

The broad purposes of our military policy have not changed since the time of Washington. Our standing army and our military organizations were, and are intended to be, merely the skeleton in time of peace for a great defensive force in time of war.

The skeleton, as has been shown in previous chapters, is not in the very best of shape. In fact, certain parts of it are missing. But the defects, if certain simple legislation can be enacted, and if military coöperation between the States and the Federal Government can be secured, can be easily remedied.

It is the total lack of any means of putting the meat on the skeleton that is declared by many military experts to be the great and serious weakness.

In an athletic club to which I once belonged, we had a crack wrestler. We called him "Fatty" because he was so thin. He knew every hold and trick of the game, and for a long time he took on anybody, big, little, or middle-sized, who cared to try conclusions with him — always with the same result, a

scientific twist of some sort or other that sent the ambitious antagonist to the mat. He finally came to a heavy-weight who had meat and science combined. Our crack wrestler, within a few seconds, discovered that he had a sprained back. He never wrestled again. He couldn't.

The proposition that the good little man cannot successfully match strength and skill with the good big man is as old as the Olympiads. Military men with whom I have talked insist that the proposition applies exactly to the question of the chances of a good little military force against a good big military force. The great problem which they have set themselves to solve is not that of the size or the organization of the regular army, nor yet that of bringing our militia organizations to a greater degree of uniformity and efficiency, though both of these go into it. It is the question of creating, back of the regular army and back of the organized militia, an adequate reserve of trained men.

Both the army and the militia are at present

at less than half of their war strength, and no means of filling out the organizations in time of war has been provided.

It is because of this condition that our army experts and some of our ablest statesmen are urging that our negligence has placed us in a position of peril.

Should war suddenly come our way, there is no reason to believe that our situation would be, in its fundamental aspects, much different from the one which Washington faced in 1775. In the light of the facts and figures which an investigation into the present state of our military preparedness reveals, the following portion of a letter written by Washington on January 4, 1776, to Joseph Reed, is most interesting: —

> Search the volumes of history through, and I much question whether a case similar to ours is to be found, namely, to maintain a post against the flower of the British troops for six months together, without powder, and then to have one army disbanded and another to be raised within the same distance of a reinforced enemy. It is too much to attempt. What may be the final issue of the last

maneuver, time only can unfold. I wish this month was well over our heads. The same desire of retiring into a chimney corner seized the troops of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, so soon as their time expired, as had wrought upon those of Connecticut, notwithstanding many of them made a tender of their services to continue till the lines could be sufficiently strengthened. We are now left with a good deal less than half-raised regiments and about 5000 militia, who only stand engaged to the middle of this month, when, according to custom, they will depart, let the necessity of their stay be ever so urgent. Thus for more than two months past I have scarcely emerged from one difficulty before I have been plunged into another.

The confusion that would inevitably mark an attempt to assemble a force to repel a land attack, and the hopelessness of sending our available forces, with their inadequate equipment and organization, against 150,000 trained troops, have been previously shown. If, as our military men assert, there is no extravagance in the speculation contained in those chapters, as to the possible results of our present state of preparedness, and if it is as-

sumed that there is a possibility of our being attacked by land, what is there that we can do that will not turn the United States into what President Wilson calls "an armed camp" and will in no way interfere with the economic activity and freedom of the individual?

For years, our General Staff and our War College, our Presidents, our Secretaries of War, and our leading active and retired army officers have been working on this question. What has been worked out combines the creation of a trained reserve strength through enlistment in the regular army, with an opportunity for the private citizen to receive military training.

Should we decide upon a reserve, it should not only be large enough to fill up the regular army and the militia, but it should be sufficiently in excess of this to make up the wastage for the first three months of a war: that is, besides being large enough to bring the army and the militia to war strength, the reserve should be at least fifteen per cent of the combined war strength of both organizations.

It should also be large enough to provide new organizations.

We can, if we want to, accomplish this by legislation. We can so change our enlistment laws that the recruit, when enlisting, will know that after he has served with the colors for a short period of training, sufficient to make him proficient as a soldier, he will, for a number of years, perhaps eight or ten, be subject to call to the colors in time of war and possibly each year for a few days of additional training.

Back of the regular army, back of the militia, and back of the reserve, should we enact legislation which would create the reserve, would still be the great citizen body. Our military policy from the beginning has considered this body as the real defensive strength of the nation. If that body should be trained, as it is trained in Switzerland and Australia, we should have an immediate military strength second to none in the world, and a security that would be the greatest safeguard against war.

In Switzerland, the training of citizens is

based absolutely on the idea that the nation shall never go to war save for defense, and the closest observers of the Swiss Government and the Swiss people agree that the military training of the citizens, even though that training is compulsory, has not in any way operated against the advanced democratic standards of that nation or against the liberty and freedom of its individual citizens.

The proponents of a system of military training for our citizens do not advocate the compulsory training which is a part of the Swiss system. They do urge, however, the advisability of opening the way for training to any citizen who desires it. A most important move in this direction is already well under way.

During the summer of 1913, two experimental military camps for the instruction of students of educational institutions were established and were highly successful. Since then two more have been opened. The object of these camps is to give the young men of the country an opportunity for a short course in

THE STUDENTS' CAMP AT LUDINGTON

STUDENTS IN THE TRENCHES AT GETTYSBURG

military training should their sense of patriotic service prompt them to fit themselves for a part in the defense of the nation. It is the policy of these camps to make the training of the most intensive character. It is now suggested that the whole period of training should be divided into three periods of not more than two months each, these months to fall during the school and college vacation time, as well as during the usual business vacation. This training, undertaken in time of peace, would be at least six times as long as the time that would be available for training of volunteers if we were suddenly confronted with war.

It is urged that besides the benefit that would come to the students through the broadening influence of intimate association with the students of other institutions, the opportunity for athletic contests as well as the acquired habits of discipline, obedience, and self-control, the nation would profit through a greater fostering of the patriotic spirit and a wider spread, among the whole citizenship of the country, of a more thorough knowledge of

military history, military policy, and military needs.

These camps, it is contended, will have an exceptional value as a military asset, since they are instrumental in instructing a class of highly intelligent and well-educated men who, in time of national emergency, would be especially well fitted to undertake the duties of officers.

Under the order of the Secretary of War, these camps are open to students between the ages of eighteen and thirty, in universities, colleges, and the graduating classes of high schools, and other schools rated as such. Applicants for admission to a student's military instruction camp must be citizens of the United States or men who have declared their intention of becoming citizens. It is required that they must be of good moral character, physically sound, and of good scholastic standing. Each season's training in the camp consumes five weeks. The students are required to attend during the full period. At the present time the students are required to pay their own

traveling expenses to and from the camp. For this reason camp sites have been selected in as central locations as possible. The military authorities furnish food for $3.50 a week for each student, or $17.50 for each year's period of training.

The students of the camps are also required to supply themselves with a uniform, consisting of two suits of cotton, olive drab, one extra pair of breeches, one campaign hat, one pair of leggings, and two olive drab shirts. A distinctive hat cord is worn to distinguish the student's uniform from the uniform of the regular army. The cost for clothing is from $5 to $10 for each student. The Government furnishes, without cost, cots, blankets, tents, cooking outfits, a complete infantry equipment, including rifles, bayonets, cartridge belts, canteens, shelter tents, tent poles and pins, haversacks, pack carriers, mess kits, and other property of the quartermaster and ordnance departments, all of which are turned in at the end of the period of training. The necessary instructors and the personnel for the organiza-

tion and maintenance of camp wagon transports, medical care and sanitation, and all other means of protecting the health and insuring the comfort of the students, which under the law can be furnished by the War Department, are provided.

Such troops of the regular army as can be spared, for purposes of demonstration and assisting in the instruction of the students, attend the camps for field maneuvers, exercises, and other forms of military training.

The course of instruction, as outlined by the War Department, is along the following lines: —

The theoretical principles of tactics, including advance and rear guards, patrols, outposts, and combat, are studied and explained in a series of informal talks, tactical walks, and war games conducted by selected competent officers.

The practical application of the above is carried out in the field by the students themselves, and also in conjunction with the regular troops, blank ammunition being used.

Military map-making and road-sketching are explained and opportunities for practical work in that subject offered to those who desire it.

The proper handling and use of the rifle is taught and experience given by means of gallery (or subcaliber) practice, and by actual firing with the service rifle and ammunition on the target range. To those students making the necessary qualifications over the prescribed course, the National Rifle Association of America offers its prescribed marksmanship badges and a trophy, to be competed for by teams representing the different educational institutions.

Physical drill, marching, camping, tent-pitching, making and breaking camp, loading and unloading wagons, camp expedients, field cooking, camp sanitation, first aid to the injured, personal hygiene, and the care of troops in the field are taught by practice.

Informal talks by selected officers are given on the following subjects: Use and duties of the different arms and branches of the service (infantry, field artillery, cavalry, engineers,

signal troops, and the medical corps); field fortification, including the laying-out, construction, and use of trenches; military bridge-building; use of explosives; demolitions; the installation and operation of field lines of electrical information and the use of buzzers, field telephones, and radio-telegraphic apparatus; signal flags, heliographs, and acetylene lanterns, and other apparatus used by signal corps organizations in the field; the tactical organization of the military forces of the United States, the reasons therefor, and comparison with that of foreign armies; the supply (food and material) of an army and the problems connected therewith; the psychology of war; the military history of our country — not the illuminated school-book versions of our victories merely, but the true versions, as taken from the official records, of our failures and defeats, as well as our successes and victories, with reasons for them; our military policy, past and present, the necessity for some sound, definite military policy; and the present scheme of organization of the land forces of the United States as pre-

pared by the General Staff of the Army and recommended by the War Department to Congress.

The schedule of instruction includes a practice march of several days' duration, in which, as nearly as possible, there are actual campaign conditions of march, bivouac, and combat such as the assumed situation would exact in war.

To each student who successfully completes the prescribed course of instruction, a certificate is issued and his name kept on file in the War Department, with such remarks as to his degree of efficiency and recommendations as to his fitness for future command as may be made by the officers in charge.

A correct understanding of the principles involved being considered of more importance, in the short time available for instruction, than the exercise itself, only that degree of precision in close order drill necessary to insure discipline is insisted upon. Extended order drill and field exercises are considered most important. Work is confined, as far as practicable, to the

morning, leaving the afternoons and evenings, with due regard to proper supervision, at the disposal of the student for rest, athletic sports, and recreation, or for such other work or instruction as he may desire and which can be given.

All companies commanded by a selected regular army officer, or officers, are aided by subaltern officers and non-commissioned officers selected from among the students themselves.

The discipline exacted is strict and just. Students are on a cadet status; that is, they are treated with the courtesy due prospective officers, but subject to all rules and regulations of the camp and to disciplinary measures for infractions.

The greatest care has been exercised by the General Staff in the selection of camp-sites, in order that they shall fulfill not only the military requirements of a good camp, with suitable grounds for maneuver purposes, but that they shall be located in a healthful, cool, and pleasant climate and in a region in each section offering advantages desirable from the summer-

outing standpoint, such as being on a lake, the seashore, or in the mountains.

The idea of the students' camp has gained ground with surprising rapidity. Not only has it become intensely popular with students themselves, but many parents have written letters congratulating the army authorities upon the benefits derived by their sons from the camps which have already been operated. Already one organization has sprung up, which is called the "Association of the National Reserve Corps of the United States." H. S. Drinker, President of Lehigh University, is president of the organization, and the following heads of representative colleges throughout the country act as its advisory committee: John G. Hibben, President of Princeton University; A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard University; Arthur Twining Hadley, President of Yale University; John H. Finley, President of the University of the State of New York; H. B. Hutchins, President of the University of Michigan; George H. Denny, President of the University of Alabama; E. W. Nichols, Superintendent,

Virginia Military Institute; Benjamin Ide Wheeler, President of the University of California.

At the close of the first period of instruction in 1913, this committee issued the following statement which has a peculiar interest as bearing upon recent objections to the military training of citizens, based on the ground that such preparation tends toward militarism: —

After careful inquiry regarding the organization and management of the camps of instruction for college students, established by the Secretary of War in the summer of 1913, we take pleasure in certifying to their excellence.

The military instruction was thorough. The discipline was strict; but the work was so well arranged that it caused enjoyment rather than hardship. The food, sanitation, and medical care were good, and the lessons received by the students in these matters were scarcely less valuable than the military instruction itself.

We commend these camps to the attention of college authorities as a most important adjunct to the educational system of the United States, furnishing the student a healthful and profitable summer course at moderate expense.



PRESIDENT WILSON DELIVERING AN ADDRESS IN FRONT OF INDEPENDENCE HALL, PHILADELPHIA, JULY 4, 1914

WELL?

Woodrow Wilson, in a statement issued September 22, 1913, as President, took this view of instruction camps: —

I am very much interested in the successful working-out of the idea of these college camps. I believe the students attending will derive not only a great deal of physical benefit from the healthful, open-air life, but also that they will benefit from the discipline, habits of regularity, and the knowledge of personal and camp sanitation which the experience in camp will give them.

At about the same time the following endorsement came from William H. Taft: —

For young men who have a taste for outdoor life and military training, — and, indeed, for "roughing it," — I can conceive of no better opportunity for them to gratify this taste than to accept the invitation of the War Department. They can be sure it will be no boys' play if they go into it, but it will not only give them substantial knowledge of the principles of military science, but an opportunity for physical development and muscular training, and a regular life that will contribute greatly to their health and strength. On the other hand, the knowledge that they will acquire will be a very good foundation for their becoming members of state

militia in their homes after graduation, and will fit them to come to the rescue of the country in an emergency whenever that may arise.

I commend the plan to the earnest consideration of all who have the tastes I have indicated, and urge that they consult the agent of the War Department who is coming here, in order to learn just exactly what their duties and what their responsibilities will be.

The suggestion has come from General Wood, who is a college man and knows college men, and is most sympathetic with college men who love outdoor life and have an inclination to do a little soldiering.

Lindley M. Garrison, as Secretary of War, also has expressed his approval of the conduct of military camps and the ideas back of them.

It is advocated that, with his training in the instruction camps completed, the trained man should be held for a period of six years as a reservist, with the understanding that he will not be called to the colors except for defense and for a yearly period of instruction not to exceed eight days. As each student in the military camp completed his instruction, he could be assigned to some reserve organization.

With a steadily increasing number of trained citizens would go the immediate necessity of finding officers. All regular officers are needed with the regular establishment and the militia is short of officers. Outside of these two organizations we have the following source of supply:

A very limited number of graduates of the better class of military schools;

A certain number of former non-commissioned officers of the regular army, who have the necessary qualifications demanded of the lower grades of volunteer officers;

A very small list of men, who have qualified through examination for appointment as officers of volunteer organizations;

A certain number of men who have passed through the Students' Instruction Camps recently established.

All these sources combined could produce a number of available men for officers which would be insignificant in comparison with the requirements. Those who are forwarding the plan advocate that military instruction in all

schools where regular officers are instructors be standardized; that each year, from the graduates of these schools, from 500 to 1000 men be appointed as provisional second lieutenants in the various arms of the service, infantry, cavalry, field and coast artillery, serving for one year in this capacity, and receiving the full pay and allowances of a second lieutenant in the regular army.

It is argued that this system would supply a well-trained reserve officer who would have, in addition to his military training at school or college, a full year's service in the regular army. The marked success of the experimental schools has led to the encouragement of plans for a very great extension of the system, and it is expected that important details, such as fixing the course of instruction and securing government aid in the way of uniforms, rations, and transportation, will be speedily worked out.

Here, then, is what we *can* do about it, whether or not we decide that it is worth while to do anything about it: —

We can supply the necessary equipment for all arms of the service in both regular army and militia;

We can provide an adequate reserve of guns, ammunition, and other necessary implements and supplies;

We can abolish useless and costly army posts and concentrate our regular forces into large and uniform groups in strategic locations;

We can bring our militia and regular army into uniformity of organization;

We can give our citizens a chance to receive military instruction;

We can build up a strong reserve.

We can do all this without altering in the slightest the position of the military in its subordination to the civil authority.

And if we want to be doubly secure against an attempt of any man or set of men to turn the United States of America into another Prussia, we can make it the law, since the people foot the bills and do the fighting, that offensive war shall not be declared except by direct vote of all the people.

That is national referendum. It would quickly and definitely solve such problems as the question of intervention in Mexico, and would be most troublesome to gentlemen who would fill their pockets by driving the nation to a season of killing and of being killed.

THE END

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